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ARTICLES
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH: ANSWERING THE UNANSWERED AND
RELATED QUESTIONS IN LANE V. FRANKS
John E. Rumel*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Lane v.
Franks' stands for an important, albeit relatively unremarkable and
uncontroversial, proposition in the annals of public employee speech
jurisprudence: Under the First Amendment, public employees are
protected from retaliation by public employers when the employee, after
having been subpoenaed to testify, provides truthful sworn testimony on
a matter of public concern, when testifying is not part of his or her
ordinary job responsibilities.2 Indeed, to state Lane's holding suggests
its validity. Thus, as far as Supreme Court decisions go, Lane was an
easy case, with Justice Sotomayor writing for a unanimous Court,
3 three
Justices concurring,4 and a relatively brief and straightforward analysis.
Easy case or not, the Lane Court's majority opinion is noteworthy
for both how it arrived at its holding, and what it did not decide. First,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., University of California
Hastings College of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz. The author would like to
thank his colleagues University of Idaho College of Law Professor Monique Lillard and Associate
Dean Lee Dillion for serving as sounding boards at critical junctures during the writing of this
Article and former and current College of Law students Pat Fackrell and Emily Joyce, respectively,
for their assistance as well. Thanks also to Professor Martin Malin for his reading and providing
input on a draft of this Article.
1. 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
2. Id. at 2374-75. The issue under Lane and, indeed, under the vast majority of public
employee speech cases is not whether the speech is protected in general under the First Amendment.
It clearly is. Rather, the question is whether the speech, although generally protected, is protected
from retaliatory adverse employment action. Thus, to the extent that the Article uses the shorthand
phrase "protected under the First Amendment" or words to that effect, the latter (and not the former)
meaning is intended.
3. Id. at 2374.
4. Id. at 2374, 2383 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J. and Alito, J., concurring).
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the opinion did not challenge, but instead, gave a narrow reading to the
Court's 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,s which had held that,
when a public employee speaks as part of his or her official duties, the
employee is speaking as an employee and not as a citizen, and that,
therefore, the speech is not protected under the First Amendment.6
Second, the Lane opinion, in reaching a result protecting public
employee speech, resurrected and applied principles from its seminal
decision in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School
District 205, Will County (i.e., that speech by public employees on
matters related to their employment holds special value precisely
because those employees gain knowledge of matters that are of public
concern through their employment-which may not be possessed by
non-employees-and that, as such, the public at large benefits from
constitutionally protecting that speech and not allowing retaliation
against those same employees).8 Third, the opinion did not grapple with,
and expressly left for another day, a more difficult doctrinal and policy
question than the one it decided (i.e., whether public employees will be
protected from public employer retaliation when they testify under the
above circumstances and in the same manner when testifying is part of
their ordinary job responsibilities).9  Also, the Court, due to the
narrowness of its Opinion, did not answer other, related questions.'0
As a threshold matter, and as numerous judges and scholars have
noted, Garcetti was wrongly decided for several, closely-connected
reasons. To begin with, Garcetti created an ill-advised "official
5. See id. at 2379 (explaining that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied a
broad reading of Garcetti in holding that when Lane testified, he did not speak as a citizen, but
rather as an employee); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
6. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22.
7. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380, 2383; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
8. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72 (using teachers as an example of the essential need to
"speak out freely"); see also Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REv. 75, 86 (2008) [hereinafter Norton, Government Workers] (opining that public
employee speech should be protected "because of its instrumental value to the public as listeners").
9. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378 n.4 (emphasis added).
10. See id. at 2376 n.2 (Lane brought claims under a state whistleblower statute, as well as
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 that the Court did not reach.).
11. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427-28 (2006) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J. and
Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines:
Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 357, 358, 358 n.4
(2011) (criticizing the Garcetti decision for the limitations it placed on public employee speech
rights); Martha McCarthy, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Another Hurdle for Public Employees, 210 WEST'S
EDUC. L. REP. 867, 876 (2006) (discussing how Justice Stevens rejected the majority's opinion in
Garcetti and argued that government employees are "still citizens while they are in the office").
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duties" threshold test which, if satisfied, takes public employee speech
outside of First Amendment protection, rather than treating speech made
pursuant to a public employee's official duties as a public employer-
favoring factor in balancing the speech rights of the employee with the
interests of his or her employer under Pickering.1
2  In addition, by
categorically dividing public employee speech between protected citizen
speech and unprotected employee speech, Garcetti formalistically and
artificially engaged in line drawing where, as a practical matter, the
citizen and employee roles often overlap in the workplace.
Furthermore, Garcetti improperly focused on the public employee's role
and duties rather than the content of the speech.
14 Specifically tied to the
immediately preceding point, Garcetti disserved the two primary reasons
for protecting public employees from retaliation by public employers
when the employee engages in speech on a matter of public concern:
First, vis-a-vis the exercise of constitutional protections, public
12. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429-30 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv'rs, LLC, 123 A.2d 1212, 1213-14 (Conn. 2015) (applying a
modified form of the Pickering/Connick balancing test, rather than the Garcetti official duties
threshold test, to public employee retaliation cases under the free speech provisions of the
Connecticut Constitution); McCarthy, supra note 11 at 878 (noting specifically that Pickering has
not been overturned by Garcetti, but much fewer circumstances now trigger the balancing test under
Pickering); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and Sec. 1983: A
Critique ofGarcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 561, 563, 595 (2008) [hereinafter Nahmod,
Public Employee Speech] (explaining that under the Pickering/Connick balancing test, public
employees who report illegal conduct to their supervisors act within First Amendment norms); Sara
J. Robertson, Note, Lane v. Franks: The Supreme Court Frankly Fails to go Far Enough, 60 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 293, 313-14 (2016) (suggesting that the Court discard the precedent employed by
Garcetti).
13. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Steven, J., dissenting); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public
Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1173, 1194-98 (2007) ("Although the Garcetti rule superficially promotes predictability by
adopting a categorical prerequisite to the balancing process, its distinction between 'official duty'
and non-official public employee speech is not self-evident."); see also Helen Norton, Constraining
Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of its Workers' Speech to Protect its 
Own
Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Norton, Constraining]; Nahmod, Public
Employee Speech, supra note 12, at 562; Bauries & Schach, supra note 11, at 357-58, 364; Paul M.
Secunda, Garcetti 's Impact on the First Amendment Rights ofFederal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND.
L. REv. 117, 123 (2008) [hereinafter Secunda, Garcetti's Impact] (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
427) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'The notion that there is a categorical difference ... is quite
wrong."').
14. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 430 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (explaining the differences in Givhan v. W Line Consol. Sch. Dist.);
Brenda R. Kallio & Richard T. Geisel, To Speak or Not to Speak: Applying Garcetti and
Whistleblower Laws to Public School Employee Speech, 264 WEST's ED. L. REP. 517, 528-529
(2011); Julian W. Kleinbrodt, Note, Pro- Whistleblower Reform in the Post-Garcetti Era, 112 MICH.
L. REV. 111, 119 (2013).
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employees hold their employment as a right, not a privilege;" and
second, as alluded to above, public employees are often in the best or
only position to gain knowledge and disclose information about matters
of public concern by virtue of their employment in the public sector
workforce.16 For these and other reasons, Garcetti should be overruled
forthwith.'"
However, having heaped scorn, not praise, upon Garcetti, but
assuming the Supreme Court does not bury Garcetti any time soon,
application of the principles relied upon by the Court in reaching its
decision in Lane should be the guiding light in resolving the unanswered
and related questions embedded in the Lane decision. As alluded to
above, those principles include recognizing public employees' rights to
enjoy job security when exercising their First Amendment rights, as well
as their important role in reporting on matters of public concern and
testifying truthfully under oath in judicial and other public proceedings.
Those open questions, which were either expressly reserved in-or
raised by the facts underlying-the Court's opinion in Lane and this
Article's answers to those questions, are as follows:
o What is the significance, if any, of the Lane Court's use on
multiple occasions of the term "ordinary job responsibilities" in contrast
to the Garcetti Court's reference to "official duties" concerning limiting
First Amendment protection for public employee speech? Although not
free from doubt, the Supreme Court's use of the term "ordinary job
responsibilities" in Lane will likely narrow the scope of public employee
speech excepted from First Amendment protection.18
o What result if a public employee, as part of his ordinary job
responsibilities and pursuant to a subpoena or as a representative of his
15. See Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST AMEND.
L. REv. 54, 56 & nn. 8, 9 (2008) ("[A]Il such speech and scholarship, inherently made pursuant to
official employment duties, is unprotected by the First Amendment.") [hereinafter Nahmod, Post-
Garcetti Blues]; Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 907, 915 (2011) [hereinafter
Secunda, Neoformalism] (arguing that Garcetti, by in effect causing public employees to forfeit
their First Amendment rights when speaking as part of their official duties, resurrects the discredited
unconditional conditions/rights-privilege doctrine in public employee speech cases).
16. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Norton, Constraining, supra note 13, at 31; Sabrina Niewialkouski, Note, Is Social
Media the New Era's "Water Cooler"? #Notiyouareagovernmentemployee, 70 U. MIAMI L. REv.
963, 983 (2016); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks
and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REv 449, 528 (2014).
17. For articles collecting scholarship both praising and criticizing Garcetti, see Bauries &
Schach, supra note 11, at 358 n.4 (citing e.g., Secunda, Garcetti's Impact, supra note 13; Secunda,
Neoformalism, supra note 15).
18. See infra notes t17-32 and accompanying text.
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or her employer, provides truthful sworn testimony about a matter of
public concern? As in Lane, and assuming Garcetti continues to set a
threshold limit on the free speech rights of public employees, a public
employee's testimony under these circumstances should be protected
under the First Amendment, subject to Pickering balancing.
19
o What result if a public employee testifies as part of those same
ordinary job responsibilities about the same subject matter, but does so
voluntarily? The answer should be no different (i.e., the employee's
speech should be protected under the First Amendment, but again
subject to Pickering balancing).2 0
o What result if the content of a public employee's sworn truthful
testimony does not relate to a matter of public concern? Although a
close question, given the importance of promoting truth-seeking in
judicial and administrative proceedings, public employees should be
protected from retaliation by their employers even when the content of
their testimony does not involve a matter of public concern.
2 1
o What result if a public employee's testimony is false or
erroneous? Generally speaking, the public employee should not be
protected from adverse employment action under the First
Amendment.22
o What result if, during testimony, the public employee
unnecessarily discloses sensitive, confidential or privileged information?
Likewise, the public employee should not be protected from adverse
23
employment action based on his or her testimony.
o What result if a public employee admits to wrongdoing while
testifying? As long as the public employee is afforded progressive
discipline and due process, the wrongdoing has a nexus to the
employee's job responsibilities, and the employee has not been granted
immunity in exchange for his or her testimony, the public employee's
admission of wrongdoing while testifying will constitute cause for
adverse employment action against the employee.
24
Part II of this Article will discuss the Lane case in detail,
summarizing the facts, lower court proceedings and the Supreme Court's
25
decision, including both the majority and concurring opinions. Part III
19. See infra notes 133-72 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 173-213 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 214-46 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 247-55 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part II.
2472017]
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLA WJOURNAL
will discuss and answer in detail the above-listed unanswered and related
questions stemming from Lane, reaching both public employer-favoring
and public employee-favoring results guided by the principles that drove
the Court's decision in Lane.26 Part IV will conclude that, assuming
Garcetti s not revisited soon by the Supreme Court, reliance on the legal
and policy principles emphasized by the Court in Lane will further the
values underlying the protection of public employee speech in the sworn
27testimony context.
II. LANE V. FRANKS
A. The Facts and Lower Court Proceedings
Edward Lane was a public employee hired by Central Alabama
Community College ("CACC") on probationary status to serve as its
Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth ("CITY"), a
program for underprivileged youth.2 8 As Director, Lane's job
responsibilities included managing the day-to-day operation of the CITY
program, hiring and firing employees, and overseeing the program's
finances.29
Like many public agencies, the CITY program faced difficult
financial times.30 In reviewing the program's finances, Lane learned that
Suzanne Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative employed by the
program, had not been reporting to her assigned CITY office.31 Lane
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part IV. Garcetti did not shut off all remedies for aggrieved public employees;
rather, it foreclosed First Amendment claims for employees who suffer retaliation and adverse
employment action for speaking as part of their official duties about matters of public concern. See
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420-22 (2006). Thus, the majority in Garcetti was quick to
point out that the Court's holding did not prevent public employees from pursuing non-First
Amendment claims under state whistleblower and labor statutes and the like. Id. at 425-26. But cf
id. at 439-41 (Souter, J., dissenting). Some scholars believe that the Court's focus on alternative,
non-First Amendment remedies will inure to the benefit of public employees. See Elizabeth Dale,
Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29
BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 175, 215-18 (2008). Other scholars have taken the position that state
whistleblower and labor statutes are insufficient to protect public employees from retaliation by
their employers. See Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of
Statutory Protection for Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 22, 26, 42 (2008); Martha M.
McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: the Impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos on
Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 209, 232-33 (2008).
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discussed the matter with Schmitz but was unsuccessful in getting her to
change this behavior.32 When Lane took the matter to CACC's president
and its attorney, they warned Lane that firing Schmitz could have
negative consequences for both him and CACC3 3-- presumably because
of Schmitz' status as a state representative.
These warnings notwithstanding, Lane went back to Schmitz and
instructed her to show up at her assigned office in Huntsville to perform
her job as a counselor.3 4 When Schmitz refused, Lane fired her.35
Schmitz then told a co-worker that she would "get [Lane] back for firing
her,"36 and that, if Lane ever appeared before the state legislature to
request money for the CITY program, "she would tell him, '[y]ou're
fired."' 37
Schmitz's termination led to several investigations into her conduct
while she was employed with the CITY program, including one by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.38 Lane eventually testified before a
grand jury concerning his reasons for firing Schmitz.3 9 A little over a
year later, the grand jury indicted Schmitz on multiple counts of mail
fraud and theft relating to her having allegedly and improperly taken
money from a program receiving federal funds.40 Specifically, the
indictment alleged that Schmitz had received over $175,000 in federal
funds even though she performed little to no work for the CITY program
and further alleged that Schmitz had submitted false time sheets
concerning her amount of hours worked and the nature of the services
rendered.41
Schmitz's federal court trial commenced approximately six months
after the indictment.42 Having been subpoenaed, Lane testified at trial
about the events leading up to his decision to fire Schmitz.43 The jury
was unable to reach a verdict, thereby causing the prosecutors to retry





36. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lane v. Cent. Alabama Cmty Coll., No. CV-1 1-
BE-0883-M, 2012 WL 5289412, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2012)).
37. Id. (internal citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2011)).
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convicted Schmitz on all but one of the multiple counts concerning her
having defrauded and stolen money from a program receiving federal
funds.46 The district court sentenced Schmitz to thirty months in prison,
and ordered her to forfeit and make full restitution of the money
fraudulently stolen from the CITY program.47
Meanwhile, the CITY program continued to experience budgetary
difficulties. 48 As a result, Lane recommended to CACC's recently-hired
president Steve Franks that he (Franks) layoff a number of CITY
employees.49 Franks did so, terminating twenty-nine CITY probationary
employees, including Lane.50 Because of ambiguity in the employees'
probationary status, Franks quickly rescinded all but two of the twenty-
nine employees' terminations.5 ' Franks, however, did not reinstate
Lane, based on Franks' stated belief that, because Lane was a director of
the CITY program and not simply an employee, he could be treated
differently than the other probationary employees.52 Not long thereafter,
CACC eliminated the CITY program and terminated its remaining
employees. 5
Lane eventually sued Franks, in both his individual and official
capacities, in federal court.54 Lane alleged that Franks had violated his
federal civil and constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and
the First Amendment by terminating Lane in retaliation for having
testified against Schmitz.5 5 "Lane sought damages from Franks in his
individual capacity and sought equitable relief, including reinstatement,
from Franks in his official capacity."56
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Franks.
Although the court concluded that there were genuine issues of material











55. Id. Lane also brought claims against CACC, claims under a state whistleblower statute
and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 in the same action. Id. at 2376 n.2.
56. Id. at 2376. Because Franks retired and was eventually replaced by Susan Burrow as
President of CACC during the pendency of Lane's lawsuit, Lane's official capacity claims against
Franks became claims against Burrow. Id. at 2376 n.3.
57. Id. at 2376.
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the court held that Franks was entitled to qualified immunity on Lane's
claim for damages. Specifically, the district court reasoned that "'a
reasonable government official in [Franks'] position would not have had
reason to believe that the Constitution protected [Lane's] testimony."'5 9
In so holding, the district court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Garcetti v. Ceballos,o which held that "'when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes."'6' Applying
Garcetti, the district court "found no violation of clearly established law
because Lane had 'learned of the information that he testified about
while working as Director at [CITY],' such that his 'speech [could] still
be considered as part of his official job duties and not made as a citizen
on a matter of public concern."'6 2
Relying on a broad interpretation of Garcetti, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.63 Specifically, the court of appeals reasoned that, "[e]ven if an
employee was not required to make the speech as part of his official
duties, he enjoys no First Amendment protection if his speech 'owes its
existence to [the] employee's professional responsibilities' and is 'a
product that the "employer himself has commissioned or created."","'
Applying this standard, the court of appeals concluded that, "Lane spoke
as an employee and not as a citizen because he was acting pursuant to
his official duties when he investigated Schmitz' [s] employment, spoke
with Schmitz and CACC officials regarding the issue, and terminated
Schmitz."65 The court likewise agreed with the district court on the
qualified immunity issue, holding that Franks would be entitled to
qualified immunity because the First Amendment right alleged by Lane
was not clearly established at the time of his termination.6 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari67 to resolve the split of
58. Id. (citing Lane v. Cent. Alabama Cmty. Coll., No. CV-11-BE-0883-M, 2012 WL
5289412, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2012)).
59. Id. (quoting Lane, 2012 WL. 5289412, at *12) (alterations in original).
60. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
61. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 and Lane, 2012 WL 5289412,
at *10).
62. Id. (quoting Lane, 2012 WL 5289412 at *10) (alterations in original).
63. Id. (citing Lane v. Cent. Alabama Cmty. Coll., 523 Fed. App'x. 709, 710 (11th Cir.
2013)).
64. Id. (quoting Lane, 523 Fed. App'x. at 711 and Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278,
1283 (11th Cir. 2009)).
65. Id. at 2376-77 (citing Lane, 523 Fed. App'x. at 712).
66. Id. at 2377 (citing Lane, 523 Fed. App'x. at 711 n.2).
67. Id. at 2377.
2017] 251
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opinions in. the courts of appeals68 on the question of "whether public
employees may be fired-or suffer other adverse employment
consequences-for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the
course of their ordinary job responsibilities."69
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. The Outcome/Result
In a unanimous opinion, with three Justices concurring, the
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision as to Lane's
section 1983 and First Amendment claims against Franks' successor,
Burrow, in her official capacity, affirmed the decision on qualified
immunity grounds as to those same claims against Franks in his
individual capacity, and remanded the case to the lower courts for
further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.70
2. Guiding and Governing Principles
Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor foreshadowed the
outcome of the decision with the opening words of the opinion. She
stated "[a]lmost [fifty] years ago, this Court declared that citizens do not
surrender their First Amendment rights by accepting public
employment."72 Citing to its seminal decision in Pickering v. Board of
Education,7 3 the Court pointed out that, in the context of public
employee speech, a "careful balance" is needed "'between the interests
of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
68. Id. at 2377 (comparing Lane, 523 Fed. App'x. at 712, with e.g., Reilly v. Atlantic City,
532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). By granting certiorari, the Court, in effect, agreed to resolve an
issue that Justice Souter had identified in his dissenting opinion in Garcetti (i.e., whether a "claim
relating to truthful testimony in court must . . . be analyzed independently to protect the integrity of
the judicial process.") Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
69. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. In framing the question in this manner, the Supreme Court did
not accept the Eleventh Circuit's premise that Lane's speech was undertaken within the scope of his
broadly defined official duties. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
70. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 2383.
71. See id. at 2374.
72. Id.
73. 391 U.S. 563; Lane, 134 S. Ct at 2374 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968)). In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court held that a school board violated the First
Amendment rights of a public school teacher by firing him after he wrote a letter to the school board
criticizing the board and superintendent's handling of school financing and revenue matters. 391
U.S. at 564-65.
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concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."'74
Similar to Pickering, the Court struck the balance in favor of Lane and
other public employees, holding that the "the First Amendment ...
protects a public employee who provided truthful sworn testimony,
compelled by subpoena, outside the course of his ordinary job
responsibilities."
By leading with and emphasizing the compatibility of public
employee speech with public employment and the Pickering balancing
test, the Court resurrected first principles that had been stated, but given
short shrift, in its two previous major public employee speech
cases-Connick and Garcetti, which had set up threshold barriers to
protecting public employees and their speech from retaliation by public
employers.76  Thus, in Connick v. Myers,77  a case involving a
questionnaire circulated internally by a disgruntled staff attorney in a
prosecutor's office, the Court had clarified its decision in Pickering by
holding that no balancing of the employee's interest in speech with the
public employer's interest in efficiently providing its public services was
necessary, unless the employee first demonstrated that the speech
involved a matter of public concern.78 More recently in Garcetti, where
a mid-level prosecutor prepared an internal memorandum as part of his
official duties, which described purported misconduct by a law
enforcement officer in swearing out a warrant affidavit and
recommending dismissal of the case, the Court determined that the
prosecutor was speaking as an employee, not as a citizen and, as such,
his speech was not protected under the First Amendment.79
Having set the tone for what was to follow, the Court in Lane then
74. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2374 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568) (alteration in original).
75. Id. at 2374-75.
76. See Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech,
30 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 5, 18 (1999) ("Connick teaches that in future public employee-free speech
cases, the threshold judicial issue is whether the speech resulting in termination pertains to a matter
of public concern."); see also McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 27, at 218 ("The Supreme Court in
Garcetti establishes a new threshold question courts must ask when determining whether a public
employee's expression will be subject to the Pickering balancing test.").
77. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
78. See id. at 143, 146 (Agreeing with prosecutor Connick that, with one exception, "no
balancing of interests is required in this case because Myers' questionnaire concerned only internal
office matters and that such speech is not upon a matter of 'public concern,' as the term was used in
Pickering," and stating further that "Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny, lead us to conclude
that if Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of
public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.").
79. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
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reiterated the two-step analytical framework for evaluating whether
public employee speech is constitutionally protected, which it had first
enunciated in Garcetti:
The first requires determining whether the employee
spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the
answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment
cause of action based on his or her employer's reaction
to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of
a First Amendment claim arises. The question becomes
whether the relevant government entity had an adequate
justification for treating the employee differently from
any other member of the general public.80
The Court next restated the distinction between citizen speech and
employee speech that drove its decision in Garcetti, explaining that
although "speech as a citizen may trigger protection. . . 'when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.'"8 At this juncture, the Court again stated the
narrow question before it, pointing out both what it was deciding and
what it was not:
It is undisputed that Lane's ordinary job responsibilities
did not include testifying at court proceedings. ... For
that reason, Lane asked the Court to decide only
whether truthful sworn testimony that is not part of an
employee's ordinary job responsibilities is citizen
speech on a matter of public concern. .. . We
accordingly need not address in this case whether
truthful sworn testimony would constitute citizen speech
under Garcetti when given as part of a public
employee's ordinary job duties, and express no opinion
on that matter today.82
80. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418).
81. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424).
82. Id. at 2378 n.4 (citations omitted). Given the Court's threshold determination that Lane's
ordinary job responsibilities did not include testifying in judicial proceedings, the Court's opinion
could have been even narrower. As discussed above, the Court's decision in Garcetti interposed an
additional threshold inquiry which left public employee speech made as part of the employee's
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3. The Legal Standard Applied
The Court subdivided the first step of the two-step inquiry,
analyzing first whether Lane's testimony at Schmitz's trial constituted
speech as a citizen, as opposed to speech as an employee, and second,
whether Lane's testimony involved a matter of public concern." As to
each issue, the Court did not have any difficulty ruling in Lane's favor.
8 4
a. The Citizen Speech v. Employee Speech Issue
As to the citizen speech issue, the Court started with its conclusion,
holding that "[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee
outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First
Amendment purposes ... even when the testimony relates to his public
employment or concerns information learned during that employment."
8 1
In so holding, the Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit and
grounded its conclusion on two separate bases.
First, the Court took the Eleventh Circuit to task for minimizing
"the nature of sworn judicial statements," and for "ignor[ing] the
obligation borne by all witnesses testifying under oath.",8  On this point,
the Court opined as follows:
Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a
quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a
simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an
obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the
official duties unprotected from retaliation, but continued to protect non-official duty speech as
citizen speech. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. Categorizing speech as official
duty/employee speech or non-official duty/citizen speech may prove difficult in a particular case.
See Caroline A. Flynn, Note, Policeman, Citizen, or Both? A Civilian Analogue Exception to
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 111 MICH. L. REv. 759, 769 (2013); see also Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv'rs,
LLC, 123 A.3d 1212, 1224-25 (Conn. 2015) The Court did not suggest in Garcetti that there is
some third category of public employee speech between employee and citizen speech in which the
speech might fall. As such, once the Court decided that Lane's testimony was not included in his
official duties, the Court could have tersely held that Garcetti's threshold test was not a barrier to
First Amendment protection and moved on to the public concern threshold and Pickering-balancing
tests.
83. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378.
84. Id. at 2378-80 ("We hold, then, that Lane's truthful swom testimony at Schmitz'[s]
criminal trials is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern.").
85. Id. at 2378.
86. Id. at 2378-79.
8 7. Id.
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truth. When the person testifying is a public employee,
he may bear separate obligations to his employer-for
example, an obligation not to show up to court dressed
in an unprofessional manner. But any such obligations
as an employee are distinct and independent from the
obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth. That
independent obligation renders sworn testimony speech.
as a citizen and sets it apart from speech made purely in
the capacity of an employee.88
Second, the Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion
that, because Lane's testimony was based upon information learned
during the course of his employment with, or related to his position at
CACC and CITY, Garcetti required that Lane's speech be treated as
employee, rather than citizen, speech.89 On this point, the Court
distinguished Garcetti by noting that the prosecutor in that case had
prepared the internal memorandum regarding law enforcement
misconduct for his supervisors recommending dismissal of a particular
case as part of his "official responsibilities," (i.e., as part of the "tasks he
was paid to perform" as a government employee).90 In contrast, the
Court characterized Lane's testimony as "speech that simply relates to
public employment or concerns information learned in the course of
public employment."9' Although the Lane Court stated that "Garcetti
said nothing about speech" of the latter kind,92 it immediately reinforced
its holding by noting that "[t]he Garcetti Court made explicit that its
holding did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue 'concerned the
subject matter of [the prosecutor's] employment,' because '[t]he First
Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker's job."' 9 3
The Court, having distinguished and clarified its holding in
Garcetti, held as to the "relatedness/official duties" issue that:
[T]he mere fact that a citizen's speech concerns
information acquired by virtue of his public
employment, does not transform that speech into





93. Id. (alteration in original) (citing and quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421
(2006)).
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employee-rather than citizen--speech. The critical
question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is
itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee's
duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.94
The Court-again, harkening back to Pickering and emphasizing a
rationale for protecting public employee speech based on information
garnered in the course of public employment which had been minimized
in Garcetti-further bolstered its holding as follows:
It bears emphasis that our precedents dating back to
Pickering have recognized that speech by public
employees on subject matter related to their
employment holds special value precisely because those
employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern
through their employment. In Pickering, for example,
the Court observed that "[t]eachers are . . . the members
of the community most likely to have informed and
definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the
operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly,
it is essential that they be able to speak out freely
without fear of retaliatory dismissal."95
Further supporting its decision concerning the breadth of Garcetti's
holding and the importance of public employee speech in corruption
cases like Lane, the Court noted the anomaly that would occur if the
speech often necessary to prosecute those cases (i.e., speech learned at
work), could not "form the basis for a First Amendment retaliation
claim." 96 The Court further noted the "impossible position" a public
employee would be in if forced to choose between testifying truthfully
about corruption witnessed in the workplace, and avoiding loss of his or
her job due to possible retaliation.97  The Court concluded that the
Eleventh Circuit erred under the first subdivision of the first step in the
94. Id. at 2379.
95. Id. at 2379-80 (citations omitted) ("[P]ublic employees 'are uniquely qualified to
comment' on 'matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large."').
96. See id. at 2380. Of course, Garcetti involved possible corruption by law enforcement
officers learned by a prosecutor during the course of his work (i.e., during the performance of his
official duties). Thus, the very anomaly that the Lane Court decried had already occurred in
Garcetti. See id.; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,410 (2006).
97. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380.
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analysis by failing to recognize that "Lane's sworn testimony [was]
speech as a citizen."98
b. The Matter ofPublic Concern Issue
The Court then tumed to the second subdivision of the first step, the
issue of whether "Lane's testimony is also speech on a matter of public
concem."99 Given the nature of the case in which Lane testified, the
Court had little trouble resolving the public concern issue in Lane's
favor. 100
The Court first laid out the well-settled standard for determining
whether speech was on a matter of public concern (i.e., whether the
speech could be "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community, or when it is [on] a subject of
legitimate news interest,"'' the resolution of which inquiry turned on
the "'content, form and context' of the speech").102
As to the content of Lane's testimony, the Court easily concluded
that Lane's testimony about "corruption in a public program and misuse
of state funds-obviously involves a matter of significant public
concern."l3 As to the form and context of Lane's speech, the Court
stated that the fact that the speech occurred as "sworn testimony in a
judicial proceeding," bolstered its conclusion that the speech involved a
matter of public concem.'04  Specifically, the Court opined that
"'[u]nlike speech in other contexts, testimony under oath has the
formality and gravity necessary to remind the witness that his or her
statements will be the basis for official governmental action, action that
often affects the rights and liberties of others."'105  Based on this
reasoning, the Court held that "Lane's truthful sworn testimony at




100. See id. ("Applying these principles, it is clear that Lane's sworn testimony is speech as a
citizen.").
101. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
102. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
103. Id. (citing and quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006)) ("Exposing
governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.").
104. See id.
105. Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (plurality
opinion)).
106. Id. at 2380.
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c. Pickering Balancing
If the Court had little difficulty resolving the public concern issue,
it had the same or less level of trouble disposing of the second step
inquiry in public employee cases-the Pickering balancing issue.1
07
The Court started its analysis of the second step by reiterating the
governing legal standard which it had stated or alluded to at the outset of
its opinion.10 8 Thus, the Court repeated that, "[u]nder Pickering, if an
employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the next
question is whether the government had 'an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the public'
based on the government's needs [as] an employer."
09 The Court then
delineated the government's interest under Pickering, pointing out that
"government employers often have legitimate interest[s] in the effective
and efficient fulfillment of [their] responsibilities to the public, including
promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,
and maintain[ing] proper discipline in public service.""o
Applying these standards, the Court found the government
employer's proof completely wanting, thus concluding that the Eleventh
Circuit had erred:
[T]he employer's side of the Pickering scale is entirely
empty: Respondents do not assert, and cannot
demonstrate, any government interest that tips the
balance in their favor. There is no evidence, for
example that Lane's testimony at Schmitz'[s] trials was
false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed
any sensitive, confidential, or privileged information
while testifying. In these circumstances, we conclude
that Lane's speech is entitled to protection under the
First Amendment.'
107. See id. at 2373-77.
108. See id. at 2377; see also supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
109. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting and citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418
(2006)).
110. Id. at 2381 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting and citing
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983)).
111. Id. at 2381. The Court also noted that "quite apart from Pickering balancing, wrongdoing
that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other discipline."
Id. at 2381 n.5; see infra note 266 and accompanying text.
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d Conclusion
As discussed previously, the Court, having ruled that Lane's
testimony constituted protected speech as a citizen under the First
Amendment, also found and concluded that Franks was entitled to
qualified immunity on Lane's claims against him in his individual
capacity, and remanded the case for further proceedings so that the lower
courts could address Lane's claims against Franks' successor Burrow. 112
4. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, wrote a brief
concurring opinion.113 The concurring justices noted that the "discrete
question" presented for decision by the Court was "whether a public
employee speaks 'as a citizen on a matter of public concern,' when the
employee gives '[t]ruthful testimony under oath . .. outside the scope of
his ordinary job duties."'1 14 According to the concurring opinion:
Answering that question requires little more than a
straightforward application of Garcetti.... The
petitioner in this case did not speak "pursuant to" his
ordinary job duties because his responsibilities did not
include testifying in court proceedings ... and no party
has suggested that he was subpoenaed as a
representative of his employer. Because petitioner did
not testify to "fulfil[l] a [work] responsibility," . . . he
spoke "as a citizen," not as an employee."'
Like the majority opinion, the concurring justices delineated the
questions that were not before-and, therefore, not decided by-the
Court, stating as follows:
We . . . have no occasion to address the quite different
112. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376-77. Although Lane was the proverbial "easy case" as far as
Supreme Court cases go, the Court held that Franks was entitled to qualified immunity because
Lane's First Amendment rights were not clearly established, and the question concerning those
rights were not "beyond debate" at the time Franks terminated Lane's employment. Id. at 2376,
2383.
113. Id.at2383-84.
114. Id. at 2383 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418); see also id. at 2374, 2378; Connick, 461
U.S. at 143; cf supra note 82 and accompanying text.
115. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2384 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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question whether a public employee speaks "as a
citizen" when he testifies in the course of his ordinary
job responsibilities. For some public employees-such
as police officers, crime scene technicians, and
laboratory analysts-testifying is a routine and critical
part of their employment duties. Others may be called
to testify in the context of particular litigation as the
designated representatives of their employers. The
Court properly leaves the constitutional questions raised
by these scenarios for another day.1 16
III. THE UNANSWERED (AND RELATED) QUESTIONS
AFTER LANE V. FRANK
A. The' Significance, if any, of the Lane Court's Use of the Term
"Ordinary Job Responsibilities, " rather than Garcetti Court's
"Official Duties" Terminology
The first question raised by the Lane opinion is a textual one.
Specifically, it stems from the Supreme Court's shift from the term
"official duties," used in Garcetti to the term "ordinary job
responsibilities," used in Lane to define the exception to First
Amendment protection for speech, to use Garcetti's phrase, "ow[ing] its
existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities."1 17
In Garcetti, the Court majority used the term "official duties" to
demarcate speech by public employees that would go unprotected under
the First Amendment, and never once used the term "ordinary job
responsibilities."'18 In contrast, the Lane majority and concurrence used
the term "ordinary" as it pertained to job responsibilities or duties nine
times.19 Neither the Lane majority nor concurrence commented on the
change in verbiage, let alone explained whether the Court's shift in
language was intended as a shift in meaning.12 0
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. See id.; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
118. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; see also Lemay Diaz, Comment, Truthful Testimony as the
"Quintessential Example as Speech as a Citizen": Why Lane v. Franks Lays the Groundwork for
Protecting Public Employee Truthful Testimony, 46 SETON HALL L. REv. 565, 586 (2016). In his
dissent, Justice Breyer twice used the term "ordinary" as it pertained to job duties. Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 444, 449-50.
119. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375, 2377-79, 2381, 2383-84; see also Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285,
294-95 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
120. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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It is, of course, possible that the Court's use of the term "ordinary
job responsibilities" in Lane was inadvertent and not intended to change
the line drawn between protected and unprotected public employee
speech by the Garcetti Court's use of the term "official duties."l21 This
view would be supported by the similarity of the two terms and the fact
that neither the Lane majority nor concurrence commented upon the
change in language. However, this interpretation would run contrary to
the axiom that a court's change in language concerning the governing
legal standard signals an intent to change the meaning of the legal
standard.122
More likely, in shifting from the term "official duties" in Garcetti
to "ordinary job responsibilities" in Lane, the Court intended to say
something about the line demarcating protected and unprotected speech
as it pertains to the employee's role in the workplace. Certainly, a
strong argument can be made that the Court's "use of the adjective
'ordinary'. . . could signal a narrowing of the realm of employee speech
left unprotected by Garcetti."I23  However, focusing more on the
Eleventh Circuit decision it was reversing, the Lane Court may have
used the term "ordinary" less to signal a narrowing in meaning from
what it had said in Garcetti, and more to clarify for lower courts that
121. See Trustees of Schs., etc. v. Sons, 187 N.E.2d 673, 674 (Ill. 1963) (opining that where
change in statutory language occurred inadvertently, legislature did not intend to change meaning of
statute).
122. See, e.g., Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008) (showing that
where the Supreme Court used different language in a Title VII retaliation case than in a Title VII
discrimination case, the legal standard in each case was held to be different); State v. Parks, 866
So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]hen the legislature amends a statute by omitting or
including words, it is to be presumed that the legislature intended the statute to have a different
meaning than that accorded it before the amendment."); United States v. Brewer, 9 M.J. 509, 512
(A.F. Ct. M. R. 1980) (where a court used different language than previously, new terminology
would be held to change the legal standard).
123. See Dibrito v. City of St. Joseph, No. 16-1357, 2017 WL 129033, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 13,
2017); Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 295; Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 569, 582 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016); Alves v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 804 F.3d 1149, 1163 (11th Cir. 2015); Boulton v.
Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015); Gibson v. Kirkpatrick, 773 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir.
2014); Diaz, supra note 118, at 585 (citations omitted); see also Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F.
Supp. 3d 481, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (emphasis in original) ("[T]he question is not whether an
employee's speech is made pursuant to any official duty, but whether it is made pursuant to one of
his ordinary official duties."). But cf Brown v. Office of State Comptroller, 211 F. Supp. 3d 455,
464 n.3 (D. Conn. 2016) (Hagan's "interpretation of Lane is too broad."). Although the above-
discussed cases suggest only that the Supreme Court's use of the term "ordinary" in Lane "could
signal" a change in the legal standard from Garcetti, one commentator has read Mpoy and Hagan as
definitively supporting the conclusion that "[kjey language in Lane reins in the scope of Garcetti so
that only on rare occasions will truthful testimony fall within the ordinary job duties of public
employees." See Diaz, supra note 118, at 585 (citations omitted).
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Garcetti's "official duties" requirement should be read narrowly.124 The
Third Circuit, without resolving the issue, has stated without explanation
that "Lane may broaden Garcetti's holding by including 'ordinary' as a
modifier to the scope of an employee's job duties"12 5-although that
judicial assertion seems clearly wrong and could only possibly be
correct if the Supreme Court intended to broaden Garcetti by replacing,
rather than modifying, the term "official" with the term "ordinary."
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not define or comment upon its
use of the term "ordinary job responsibilities" in Lane.126  Likewise, the
Court did not address the meaning of the new term in its next public
employee speech case.127 Also, lower courts have been able to avoid the
definitional issue by concluding that the speech in the case before them
fell within the meaning of both the Garcetti and Lane terminology, or
instead, ruled in favor of a public official on qualified immunity
grounds.12 8 For these reasons, there is no definitive judicial guidance on
the subject.
Because the Supreme Court gave no explanation for its shift in
language from Garcetti's "official duties" standard to Lane's "ordinary
job responsibilities" test, accurately predicting the threshold standard
that the Court will use-a standard based on the roles and duties of the
affected public employee-to limit public employee speech rights, is
extremely problematic. However, several guiding principles may be
124. See Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169,.179 (3d Cir. 2015) (declining to reach the
question of "whether Lane modified or merely clarified Garcetti" in terms of the official duties
standard); see also Joseph Deloney, Note, Protecting Public Employee Trial Testimony, 91 CHI.
KENT L. REv. 709, 710-11 n.13 (2016) (By shifting from the term "official duties" to "ordinary job
responsibilities," "[t]he [Lane] Court seemed to refine its conception of Garcetti and unequivocally
reject the broad interpretation adopted by the Eleventh Circuit." (citations omitted)).
125. Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 990 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis
added). Inexplicably, the Third Circuit quotes the D.C. Circuit's above-quoted statement in Mpoy
concerning Lane's narrowing the Garcetti official duties standard as support for its statement in
Dougherty. Flora, 776 F.3d at 178 (quoting Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 294-95).
126. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2384 (2014).
127. See Heffernan v. City of Patterson, 578 U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1414 (2016) (holding that
the supervisor's mistaken belief that the officer was involved in the mayoral campaign did not bar a
First Amendment retaliation claim by the officer).
128. See Lefebrve v. Morgan, No. 14-CV-5322 (KMK), 2016 WL 1274584, at *10 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (showing where public employee's speech "was related to the heart of his
job responsibilities," any possible distinction between Garcetti and Lane standards did not affect the
court's analysis); Cory v. City of Basehor, 631 F. App'x. 526, 529 (10th Cir. 2015) ("Mr. Cory's
reports did not merely 'concern' his duties, but were made 'within the scope' of his duties as a
police officer."); Gibson, 773 F.3d 661 at 668-69 (not reaching the question of whether Lane altered
Garcetti, since a "clearly established" standard for qualified immunity dictated the result in favor of
the individual defendant); Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 295-96 (likewise not reaching the question after
concluding defendants were entitled to qualified immunity).
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articulated.- First, to the extent that the Court continues to limit those
speech rights with a Garcetti-type barrier, it is likely that the Court will
adopt one standard. Given that the Court predicated its decision in
Garcetti on a bright line distinction between unprotected public
employee speech and protected citizen speech,129 it would make little
sense to draw that line based on the official duties of the employee in
cases when the employee is not testifying under oath, and on the
ordinary job responsibilities of that same public employee when judicial
or administrative testimony is involved. Second, based on the general
principle that exceptions to First Amendment protections should be
narrowly construed,130 and on the substantive principle initially
advanced in Pickering and resurrected in Lane that public employee's
serve an important role as a source of information about the operation of
public entities,"' the Court should adopt and apply the phraseology that
make the least incursion on public employee speech rights. Third, as
courts and commentators have noted, based on a textual reading of the
two phrases, Lane's "ordinary job responsibilities"--and particularly the
term "ordinary"-formulation leaves less public employee speech
unprotected than Garcetti's "official duties" formulation.13 2
For these reasons, as long as the Court continues to carve out an
exception to public employee First Amendment protection premised on
the scope of the employee's job duties, it should apply Lane's narrower
ordinary job responsibilities standard to public employee speech cases.
B. Testimony as Part of a Public Employee's Ordinary Job
Responsibilities/Official Duties
As of this writing, there have not been any post-Lane cases
discussing the question expressly left open by both the majority and
concurrence in Lane, (i.e., whether a public employee speaks as a
citizen-and cannot be retaliated against by a public employer-when
129. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
130. SeeMorgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 408 n.24 (5th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he Supreme Court
in recent years has made it clear that the First Amendment has a broad reach, limited only by
narrow, traditional carve-outs from its protection.").
131. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968); Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
132. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 303 (quoting Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378) ("[W]hether the
speech is 'pursuant to' the employee's ordinary job duties was further defined than it had been
previously in Garcetti. Seemingly without hesitation, the Court declared that '[t]ruthful testimony
under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen
for First Amendment purposes,' even when the testimony concerns his public employment or
information obtained during that employment.").
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he or she provides truthful sworn testimony as part of his or her ordinary
job responsibilities13 3 or, as specifically anticipated by the concurrence,
as a result of being designated as a witness by the employer under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6)).1 3 4  In other words, no post-
Lane cases have addressed the issue of whether truthful testimony by
public employees which occurs as a result of their ordinary job
responsibilities constitutes an exception to Garcetti's official duties
threshold limitation.135  However, several cases decided prior to Lane,
but after Garcetti, reached divergent results and in so doing, shed light
on the issue.13 6
The first major case addressing the "official duties/truthful sworn
testimony". issue involved infamous former Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich in Tamayo v. Blagojevich. 137 Plaintiff Tamayo was
133. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2384 (Thomas J., Scalia J., and Alito J., concurring); Crystal v.
Barrett, No. JKB-14-3989, 2015 WL 5698534, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2015) (noting that Lane left
open the question of whether testimony pursuant to a public employee's ordinary job
responsibilities constitutes protected speech and leaving the question open itself at an early stage in
the proceedings).
134. Lane, 134 U.S. at 2384. Section 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
in pertinent part as follows:
In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or
private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or
other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for
examination. The named organization must then designate one or more
officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who
consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each
person designated will testify. . . . The persons designated must testify about
information known or reasonably available to the organization.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
135. See Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (only
addressing whether speech was within scope of employee's job responsibilities); see also Cory v.
City of Basehor, 631 Fed. App'x 526, 530 (10th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (same). The closest a
court has come to directly addressing the question expressly left open in Lane was in Rayborn v.
Bossier Parish School System, 198 F. Supp. 3d 747 (W.D. La. 2016). In Rayborn, a public school
nurse alleged that school officials retaliated against her when, among other things, she turned over
her notes concerning a student in response to a subpoena. Id. at 758-59. Focusing on the fact that
the nurse's official duties included maintaining records concerning her nursing activities, the district
court was "not persuaded" by the nurse's attempt, based on the notes having been subpoenaed, "to
analogize their constitutional status to that of the testimony protected in Lane." Id. at 759. In
rejecting the nurse's First Amendment claim, the court was unclear on whether it was distinguishing
her subpoenaed notes from Lane's trial testimony or, instead, was deciding the open question in
Lane in favor of the public employer. Clarity eventually may be obtained on this issue, since, as of
this writing, Rayborn is pending on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
136. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 299. Because of the difficulty in the application of the
Garcetti rule, lower courts struggled with whether or not speech falls within the scope of "official
duties," or is otherwise subject to First Amendment protection. Id.
137. 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008).
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appointed by defendant Blagojevich as Interim Administrator of the
Illinois Gaming Board ("1GB"). 138 Tamayo quickly became at odds with
the Governor's Office and the Illinois Department of Revenue
("IDOR"). 139 Tamayo eventually publicly testified before the Illinois
House Gaming Committee about the Governor and the IDOR's alleged
interference with IGB operations, their alleged misuse of public funds,
and their alleged attempts to influence the outcome of licensing
investigations and sales of casinos.14 0 Shortly thereafter, Blagojevich
appointed an entirely new IGB which, in turn, prevented Tamayo from
performing her duties as Interim Administrator.14 1 The IGB eventually
relegated Tamayo to her prior position in the IGB and diminished her
former duties in her old position even further.14 2 Tamayo then brought
claims against Blagojevich and two other Illinois state officials, alleging,
among other claims, that they had constructively discharged her in
violation of her First Amendment rights.14 3 The district court dismissed
Tamayo's entire complaint.144
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in
part.145 Specifically, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Tamayo's First Amendment retaliation claim based
on-and without differentiating the case fronm-Garcetti.146 Thus, the
court of appeals held as follows:
When, as here, a complaint states that the senior
administrator of an agency testified before a conmmittee
of the legislature charged with oversight of the agency
about allegedly improper political influence over that
agency, the natural reading of such an allegation is that
the official, in so informing the legislators, was
discharging the responsibilities of her office, not
appearing as "Jane Q. Public." Reporting alleged
misconduct against an agency over which one has
general supervisory responsibility is part of the duties of
such an office. . . . Here, . . . a natural reading of the
138. Id. at 1078.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1079.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1079-80.
144. Id. at 1080-81.
145. Id. at 1078, 1092-93.
146. Id. at 1091-92 (citations omitted).
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complaint is that Ms. Tamayo testified before the House
Gaming Committee because of the position she held
within the agency; she testified about matters within the
scope of her job duties as Interim Administrator.
Accordingly, we must conclude that Ms. Tamayo's
testimony was given as an employee and not as a
citizen; therefore, her speech is not protected under the
First Amendment.14 7
Five weeks later, the Third Circuit took up the "official
duties/sworn truthful testimony" issue in Reilly v. Atlantic City.14 8
Plaintiff Reilly, a former Atlantic City police officer, allegedly suffered
adverse employment action in retaliation for his having participated in
an investigation and testifying at the trial of Munoz, a friend of
Defendant Atlantic City police official, Flipping.14 9 Reilly then brought
suit against the City, Flipping, and two other officials alleging, among
other claims, violation of his First Amendment rights.'s
After the district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on Munoz's First Amendment claims, the court of appeals
affirmed.'5' In so holding, the Third Circuit distinguished the case from
Garcetti, stating as follows:
Here, however, Reilly, as an Atlantic City police officer,
assisted a state investigation of a fellow officer and
testified for the prosecution at the subsequent trial.
Thus, the speech at issue on this appeal, Reilly's trial
testimony, appears to have stemmed from his official
duties in the investigation....
147. Id. at 1092.
148. 532 F.3d 216, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2008).
149. Id. at 219-20.
150. Id. at 219-20, 222.
151. Id. at 233, 237.
152. Id. at 231. The district court made no findings on whether testifying at trial was part of
Reilly's official duties and the parties disputed the issue on appeal. Id. at 227. The Third Circuit
assumed in the above-quoted passage that testifying was part ofReilly's official job responsibilities,
and other courts have assumed that Reilly stands for that proposition. See id at 231; see, e.g.,
Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 708 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the Third Circuit found
that "Reilly's speech was pursuant to his job duties"), overruled on other grounds, Dahlia v.
Rodriquez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013); Whitfield v. Chartiers Valley Sch. Dist., 707 F.
Supp. 2d 561, 573 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (characterizing Reilly as involving "whether courtroom
testimony given pursuant to a government employee's official duties is still protected by the First
Amendment post-Garcetti"). In Lane, however, and notwithstanding this prior history, the Supreme
2017] 267
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL
Because Garcetti offers no express instruction on the
application of the First Amendment to the trial
testimony of a public employee, we turn to the settled
principles . . .: "[t]he duty to testify has long been
recognized as a basic obligation that every citizen owes
his Government." The citizen's obligation to offer
truthful testimony in court is necessary to protect the
integrity of the judicial process and to insulate that
process from outside pressure. Much as the duty to
testify is not vitiated by one's role as a newsman, . . . or
as the President of the United States, . . . the citizen's
obligation to testify truthfully is no weaker when one is
employed by the government in any other capacity.
Thus, the act of offering truthful testimony is the
responsibility of every citizen, and the First Amendment
protection associated with fulfilling that duty of
citizenship is not vitiated by one's status as a public
employee. That an employee's official responsibilities
provided the initial impetus to appear in court is
immaterial to his/her independent obligation as a citizen
to testify truthfully. 153
Court cited to Reilly, along with Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lane itself, as cases embodying
"discord among the [c]ourts of [a]ppeals as to whether public employees may be fired---or suffer
other adverse employment consequences-for providing truthful testimony outside the course of
their ordinary job responsibilities." See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2377 (2014)
(emphasis added); see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
153. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231 (citations omitted). In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit
stated, "we are aware of no precedential appellate decision after Garcetti answering the question
whether truthful trial testimony arising out of the employee's official responsibilities constitutes
protected speech." Id. at 230. In a footnote at the end of that statement, the court stated that "the
Seventh Circuit recently held that a plaintiffs testimony at a legislative hearing was not protected
because it 'was given as an employee and not as a citizen. . . .' That issue is distinct from the one
before us on appeal." Id at 230 n.5 (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1092 (7th Cir.
2008)). Testimony before the legislature should not be treated differently than testimony before a
judicial tribunal. See Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d 253, 258 (7th Cir. 1994) (arguing that testimony
before a legislative committee is protected); see also Piesco v. City of New York, Dept. of Pers.,
933 F.2d 1149, 1157 (2d Cir. 1991) (reaching the same conclusion as the Dahm case). Thus, to the
extent that the Third Circuit thought that Tamayo was distinguishable from Reilly because Tamayo
involved testimony before a legislative committee, while Reilly involved testimony in court, that
distinction is not material. See Whitfield, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 577 ("The fact that plaintiffs sworn
testimony was given at a school board hearing, as opposed to inside a courtroom, is a distinction
without a difference."); accord Robinson v. Balog, 160 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 1998) ("By
responding to the Board's invitation to testify at a public hearing and by cooperating with law
enforcement investigators, Robinson and Marc spoke not in their 'capacity as .. . public
employee[s],' . . . but as 'citizen[s] upon matters of public concern."'). Whether the testimony is
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The Third Circuit "concluded that Reilly's truthful testimony in
court constituted citizen speech and that his claim is not foreclosed by
the 'official duties' doctrine enunciated in Garcetti."l54
A year later, the Ninth Circuit took up the issue in Huppert v. City
of Pittsburg.155  In Huppert, a police officer alleged that he was
retaliated against by city officials after, among other things, he testified
before a grand jury investigating potential corruption in the Pittsburg
Police Department ("PPD").156  Over a strong dissent (which relied in
part on Reilly),157 the court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment on Huppert's First Amendment claim, stating:
[I]t is manifest that California expects such testimony
from its police officers. As the California Court of
Appeal made clear: "When police officers acquire
knowledge of facts which will tend to incriminate any
person, it is their duty to disclose such facts to their
superiors and to testify freely concerning such facts
when called upon to do so before any duly constituted
court or grand jury." Testifying before a grand jury
charged with investigating corruption is one part of an
officer's job.... Therefore, any speech Huppert gave
during his grand jury testimony was "pursuant to his
duties as a [police officer]," and that speech is not
protected by the First Amendment.15 8
After reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit, replicating the
unadorned analysis of Garcetti articulated by the Seventh Circuit in
delivered in a judicial, legislative or administrative forum, consistent with the obligation noted in
Lane, society, the tribunal and the parties affected by the decisions emanating from it all have
significant interests in the receipt of truthful testimony. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
154. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231; accord Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007);
Walker v. Town of Hennessey, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1274 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (concluding based in
part on "persuasive reasoning of the Third Circuit in Reilly," that a police officer's prospective
testimony in a homicide case, which arose out his "official responsibilities," constituted protected
speech).
155. 574 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2009).
156. See id. at 703.
157. Id. at 710, 721 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 707-08 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also
Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App'x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing Green's testimony regarding
"official duties"); Deprado v. City of Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1346-47 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(finding speech was not that of a private citizen).
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Tamayo, went on to state that:
We decline to follow the Third Circuit's decision in
Reilly. There, the Third Circuit ... instead of finding
that [Reilly's testifying in a trial against another police
officer] was obviously speech pursuant to Reilly's job
duties, the court took a swift turn to conclude that
truthful testimony is never part of a police officer's
duties. This is in sharp contradiction to the Supreme
Court's holding in [Garcetti],which drew a distinct line
between speech pursuant to one's job duties and speech
in a private capacity. By first finding that Reilly's
speech was pursuant to his job duties, but subsequently
concluding that it was protected by the First
Amendment, the Reilly court impermissibly began
chipping away at the plain holding in [Garcetti].s9
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court leaving the "ordinary job
responsibilities/truthful testimony" question unanswered in Lane, the
appellate courts were essentially evenly split on the issue.160
159. Huppert, 574 F.3d at 708 (citations omitted). Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's assertion,
the Third Circuit in Reilly did not conclude that truthful testimony is never part of a police officer's
duties. Id.; Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231. Rather, the Reilly Court concluded that "[w]hen a government
employee testifies truthfully, s/he is not 'simply performing his or her job duties,' rather, the
employee is acting as a citizen ..... Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231 (emphasis added) (quoting Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006)). Thus, the Third Circuit stated only that a public employee's
act of testifying goes beyond or is in addition to the performance of the employee's job duties. See
id at 231. As such, the Ninth Circuit's characterization of Reilly in Huppert is inaccurate on this
point. See Huppert, 574 F.3d at 708; see also John G. Mulligan, Note, Huppert, Reilly, and the
Increasing Futility of Relying on the First Amendment to Protect Employee Speech, 19 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 449, 456 (2010) (characterizing the Ninth Circuit's statement as "seemingly
misstat[ing] the Third Circuit's holding"). Another panel of the Ninth Circuit roundly criticized
Huppert for its evaluation of the "official duties" issue. See Dahlia v. Rodriquez, 689 F.3d 1094,
1102-04 (9th Cir. 2012). An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit eventually "overrule[d] Huppert to
the extent that it improperly relied on a generic job description and failed to conduct the 'practical,'
fact-specific inquiry [regarding defining a public employee's official duties] required by Garcetti."
Id. at 1071.
160. Compare e.g., Huppert, 574 F.3d at 708 with Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231. In contrast, pre-Lane
commentators were much more in accord. To be sure, one pre-Lane commentator took a middle
ground position, arguing that a public employee who testified either voluntarily or under subpoena
and not on behalf of his employer, should be protected under the First Amendment and not be
deemed unprotected official-duty speech, but that testimony given on behalf of the government as
part of the public employee's job duties should not be protected under Garcetti. See Matt Wolfe,
Comment, Does the First Amendment Protect Testimony by Public Employees?, 77 U. CHi. L. REv.
1473, 1473, 1491 (2010). However, most pre-Lane commentators took the position that all truthful
testimony provided by a public employee-not just truthful testimony falling outside the scope of a
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Based largely on the Supreme Court's decision in Lane and on its
reliance on Pickering, the Supreme Court and post-Lane lower courts
should side with the Third Circuit's decision in Reilly and carve out an
exception to Garcetti's threshold limitation by protecting truthful
testimony given as part of a public employee's ordinary job
responsibilities.16 1 Several reasons support this proposed outcome.
First, the added factor of sworn testimony in judicial or
administrative proceedings meaningfully and substantively distinguishes
the question left unanswered in Lane from the public employee speech
in Garcetti-an unsworn internal memorandum-and indeed, all other
public employee speech cases not involving testimony before a tribunal.
Sworn testimony is different. As quoted previously, but worth
repeating, the Lane Court emphasized that:
Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a
quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a
simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an
obligation, to the court and to society at large, to tell the
truth. When the person testifying is a public employee,
he may bear separate obligations to his employer. ...
But any such obligations as an employee are distinct and
independent from the obligation, as a citizen, to speak
the truth. That independent obligation renders sworn
testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from
speech made purely in the capacity of an employee.162
Related, the duty to provide truthful sworn testimony raises the
quasi-Catch-22/Hobson's choice dilemma for public employees pointed
out by the Court in Lane and by both pre- and post-Lane
public employee's official duties-should be treated as citizen speech and protected under the First
Amendment. See Adelaida Jasperse, Note, Constitutional Law-Damned if You Do, Damned if You
Don't: A Public Employees Trilemma Regarding Truthful Testimony, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 623,
625-26, 651-55 (2011); Jody L. Rodenberg, Note, Freedom of Speech and the "Catch-22" for
Public Employees in the Ninth Circuit - Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 63 S.M.U. L. REV. 259, 264
(2010); Leslie Pope, Comment, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg: The Contested Status of Police
Officers'Subpoenaed Testimony after Garcetti v. Ceballos, 119 YALE L.J. 2143, 2148-49 (2010).
161. For an article likewise suggesting that truthful testimony on matters of public concern
pursuant to ordinary job duties is protected citizen speech and taking the position that the seeds of
this conclusion can be found in the Supreme Court's decision in Lane itself, see Diaz, supra note
118, at 566, 597.
162. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014) (citations omitted); see also
supra note 88.
2712017]1
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL
commentators. 163  Thus, as Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court in
Lane, a rule
conclud[ing] that the very kind of speech necessary to
prosecute corruption by public officials-peech by
public employees regarding information learned through
their employment may never form the basis of a First
Amendment retaliation claim. Such a rule would place
public employees who witness corruption in an
impossible position, torn between the obligation to
testify truthfully and the desire to avoid retaliation and
keep their jobs.'6
This dilemma will exist whether a public employee is testifying as
part of his or her ordinary job responsibilities or, specifically, as a Rule
30(b)(6) designee of his employer or not.165  Moreover, whichever
choice a public employee makes will be detrimental to both the
employee and society at large. If the employee testifies falsely or less
than candidly, the employee may face perjury charges or, at the very
least, the opprobrium and scorn of the court and anyone who observes or
learns of his or her testimony. Likewise, as pointed out by the Court in
Lane and Pickering, false testimony will deprive society (and the judge,
jury and parties before the court) of valuable, accurate information from
a public employee who may be ideally or uniquely suited to provide the
testimony.166 If, however, the employee testifies truthfully, without the
163. See id at 2379-80. In another article, post-Lane commentator Deloney agrees with pre-
Lane commentators Jasperse and Rodenberg, and post-Lane commentator Diaz, that sworn
testimony pursuant to a public employee's ordinary job responsibilities should be protected citizen
speech. See Deloney, supra note 124, at 711-12; Jasperse, supra note 160, at 623-24; Rodenberg,
supra note 160, at 264.
164. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380; see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
165. See Deloney, supra note 124, at 731 ("The fact-finding function of trials is undermined no
less because persons providing false or misleading testimony are public servants acting in the course
of their ordinary job duties rather than outside the scope of their daily responsibilities."); see also
supra note 134 and accompanying text. For this reason, and although testifying as a Rule 30(b)(6)
representative of an employer might be considered, to paraphrase Justice Sotomayor in Lane,
quintessential speech as an employee, the above-discussed dilemma-the importance of truthful
sworn testimony to the judicial and administrative process and society's need for information about
matters of public concern-all militate in favor of protecting public employees from retaliation even
when their testimony is pursuant to a Rule 30(b)(6) designation.
166. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. In Lane, the court held "[i]t bears emphasis that our
precedents dating back to Pickering have recognized that speech by public employees on subject
matter related to their employment holds special value precisely because those employees gain
knowledge of matters of public concern through their employment." Id at 2379. "In Pickering, for
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security of First Amendment protection, he or she runs the risk of being
retaliated against by his employer. Although society (and the above-
mentioned stakeholders) will initially receive the benefit of the
Pickering-promoted information, society (and future judicial or
administrative tribunal stakeholders) will ultimately be disserved as
public employees chill their own speech and/or censor themselves
because of the very real specter of adverse employment consequences.
In addition, much like in Lane, the individual speaker's and
society's interest in truthful sworn testimony given by public employees
as part of their ordinary job responsibilities will seldom be outweighed
by public employers' interest in managerial efficiency or control under
Pickering.16 8 In what should be relatively rare instances, the importance
of truthful testimony and its role in maintaining the integrity of the
judicial or administrative process and promoting public awareness about
matters of public concern may be sufficiently counterbalanced by a
public employer's (and society's) legitimate interest in maintaining
confidentiality concerning an ongoing investigation by law
enforcement, 69 or a matter of national security.o And, in those
relatively rare circumstances, the court itself will have the ability to
protect the public employer's interest by determining, prior to the
testimony, whether the evidence is admissible or, specific to the issue
before it, determining whether the government's interest in
confidentiality outweighs the public employee's interest as a citizen, and
society's interest in having the employee testify truthfully about a matter
of public concern.17 ' Thus, to borrow from Lane, when a public
example, the Court observed that '[t]eachers are ... the members of a community most likely to
have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should
be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without
fear of retaliatory dismissal." Id. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1969)).
Most recently, the Court again observed that public employees "are uniquely qualified to comment"
on "matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large." San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 521, 523 (2004).
167. See Deloney, supra note 124, at 730; see also Diaz, supra note 118, at 590, 592.
168. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 (concluding that "the employer's side of the Pickering scale
[was] entirely empty").
169. See Deloney, supra note 124, at 734 ("If an employee discloses confidential information,
although truthful, the government could take action without violating that employee's First
Amendment rights."); see also infra note 228 and accompanying text.
170. See Diaz, supra note 118 at 595 ("Perhaps in some rare circumstance, such as in the realm
of national security, the government in its role as an employer may articulate an important
government interest requiring utmost confidentiality. And under such circumstances, the
government employer may truly possess a strong managerial discretionary interest in curtailing the
public employee's speech.").
171. Deloney, supra note 124, at 719.
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employee testifies truthfully as part of his or her ordinary job
responsibilities, "the employer's side of the Pickering scale" will almost
always be "entirely empty." 17 2
In conclusion, as long as the Supreme Court continues to adhere to
its decision in Garcetti, courts should carve out an exception to
Garcetti-tempered only rarely by Pickering balancing-by protecting
public employees from retaliation and adverse employment
consequences when they testify truthfully about a matter of public
concern as part of their ordinary job responsibilities.
C Voluntary/Non-Compelled Testimony
As with the "ordinary job responsibilities/truthful sworn testimony"
question, few, if any, post-Lane cases have discussed whether voluntary
testimony should enjoy the same protection as compelled (i.e.,
subpoenaed) testimony under the First Amendment.173 Again, pre-Lane
case law, as well as the rationale underlying the Court's holding in Lane
(and pre- and post-Lane scholarship) provides some guidance.
1. Protection of Voluntary Testimony as a Threshold Matter
Several courts in the Second Circuit have concluded that voluntary
testimony should receive First Amendment protection, succinctly stating
that "[v]oluntarily appearing as a witness in a public proceeding or a
lawsuit is a kind of speech that is protected by the First Amendment."l7 4
However, the best explication of this principle comes from the Third
Circuit. 175
172. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381.
173. Two post-Lane cases have addressed voluntary, as opposed to compelled, statements, but
neither case discussed whether voluntary testimony would receive the same First Amendment
protection from retaliation as the subpoenaed testimony in Lane. Neither case is on point on the
"voluntary vs. compelled testimony" question. See Helget v. City of Hays, No. 13-2228-KHV,
2015 WL 1263118, at *I1 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2015) (factual showing that a voluntary sworn
affidavit caused the court to assume, without deciding, that plaintiffs speech was a matter of public
concern), af'd on other grounds, 844 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2017); see also Wagner v. Lee Cry.,
Florida Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, No. 2:14-cv-29-FtM-38CM, 2014 WL 4145500, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 21, 2014) (explaining that this case differs from Lane in that the statements involved voluntary
internal statements, not judicial testimony).
174. Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 210 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted);
accord Caruso v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 430, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Jackler v. Byrne,
658 F.3d 225, 239 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); Frisenda v. Inc. Vill. of Malverne, 775 F.
Supp. 2d 486, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
175. See Green v. Phildelphia Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886-89 (3d Cir. 1997).
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In Green v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, Plaintiff Green, who
was an officer in the Defendant Housing Authority police drug task
force, voluntarily appeared to testify--on his own time, in civilian
clothes and with consent of his immediate supervisor-as a character
witness at a bail hearing for the son of a friend.176 However, after he
was introduced at the hearing and learned that the criminal defendant,
Keller, was charged with participating in organized crime, he "told
Keller he could not be associated with the case and left the hearing
without testifying."17 7 That same day, an unidentified officer informed
Green's higher-level supervisor that "Green had appeared as a character
witness for a member of the Stanfa crime organization." 78
Subsequently, the Deputy Chief of the Housing Authority Police
Department and its Chief of Police transferred Green from his task force
position to a regular patrol position where his duties were greatly
diminished.179
. Green brought suit against the Housing Authority and its officials
alleging, among other claims, that the defendants had violated his First
Amendment rights by transferring him in retaliation for his having
appeared at the bail hearing.80  At trial, the Deputy Chief and Chief
testified that they did not believe that Green himself was a member of
organized crime, but made the decision to transfer Green because his
appearance at the bail hearing might embarrass or discredit the image of
the Housing Authority or put Green in danger.'8 ' The trial court
dismissed Green's claims at the close of evidence.'8 2  The Court of
Appeals affirmed, but recognized, as a threshold matter, that Green's
voluntary appearance at the bail hearing was a matter of public concern
protected from retaliation under the First Amendment.'83
The Third Circuit started its analysis by acknowledging that "a
public employee's appearance as a witness, even in the absence of actual
testimony, is 'speech"' under the First Amendment.'84  The court of





181. Id. at 884-85.
182. Id. at 885.
183. Id. at 885-87, 890. The issue of whether testimony in court is invariably a matter of
public concern or only a matter of public concern when the testimony relates to a political, social or
other concern to the community is a separate unanswered question emanating from Lane and will be
addressed at Part W.E. See infra Part m.D.
184. Green, 105 F.3d at 885 (citing Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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appeals, simultaneously distinguishing voluntary from compelled
testimony and anticipating the Supreme Court's rationale in Lane for
protecting sworn testimony, initially stated as follows:
Although in practical terms it may be inconsequential
whether a witness has been subpoenaed (one can
"volunteer" to receive a subpoena), there would appear
to be a conceptual distinction that turns on a witness's
will or desire to testify, especially in this context where
the witness is a law enforcement officer. It should
matter, therefore, whether a police officer chooses to
interject himself into a bail hearing, which is an
adversary proceeding, as a character witness for a
defendant. On the other hand, there is a compelling
reason to find Green's appearance to be a matter of
public concern regardless of its voluntary nature. That
reason, of course, is the integrity of the truth seeking
process. 185
The court then dug deeper into what would become the Lane
Court's rationale for protecting testimony compelled by subpoena,
stating that:
For guidance we will turn . .. to a line of cases ...
holding a public employee's truthful testimony, even if
voluntary, is inherently a matter of public concern
protected by the First Amendment. As the Fifth Circuit
observed, "When an employee testifies before an
official government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he
speaks in a context that is inherently of public concern.
Our judicial system is designed to resolve disputes, to
right wrongs. We encourage uninhibited testimony,
under penalty of perjury, in an attempt to arrive at the
truth. We would compromise the integrity of the
judicial process if we tolerated state retaliation for
testimony that is damaging to the state. Identical
concerns are implicated by Green's voluntary
appearance at Keller's bail hearing, where the court
depends upon accurate testimony by those familiar with
185. Id. at 886.
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the defendant in order to determine whether the
defendant is likely to flee or endanger the community.
The utility of uninhibited testimony and the integrity of
the judicial process would be damaged if we were to
permit unchecked retaliation for appearance and truthful
testimony at such proceedings. Not only would "the
first amendment right of the witness be infringed by this
type of coercion, the judicial interest in attempting to
resolve disputes by arriving at the truth would be in
jeopardy. Furthermore, a witness who succumbed to
any real or imagined coercion could also be subject to a
charge of perjury."186
The court concluded by stating that it could "discern no reason why
a voluntary appearance would eliminate the public interest. Therefore,
we hold that Green's voluntary appearance as a character witness is a
matter of public concern."1 87
In contrast, the only post-Garcetti/pre-Lane decision that has held,
as a threshold matter, that voluntary testimony is not protected under the
First Amendment is Kiehle v. County of Cortland.'18  In Kiehle, the
Plaintiff, a Department of Social Services ("DSS") caseworker, brought
a retaliatory discharge claim alleging that the County and several of its
officials violated her First Amendment rights after they fired her for
voluntarily testifying at a family court hearing.18 9  In an unpublished
opinion, the Second Circuit upheld her firing, concluding as follows:
[A]t the Family Court hearing, Kiehle testified that the
Family Court petitioner-a mother seeking to re-obtain
custody of her daughter-was able to adequately
supervise, and was not neglectful of, her children.
186. Id. at 886-87 (citations omitted).
187. Id. at 887; accord Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 361-62, 362 n.28 (5th Cir. 2004)
(expert witnesses received subpoenas, but testified voluntarily); see also Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d
1197, 1201, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2000) (expert witness for criminal defendant); Tedder v. Norman,
167 F.3d 1213, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1999) (voluntary deposition testimony). The Third Circuit in
Green did not terminate its analysis by concluding that voluntary testimony was invariably
protected under the First Amendment; rather the court of appeals in Green-and the courts of
appeals in the other cases cited above-went on to analyze whether the speech was protected under
the Pickering-balancing test. See Green, 105 F.3d at 887-89; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 358-67;
Worrell, 19 F.3d at 1205-09; Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1214-15. This aspect of the analysis will be taken
up at Part F. See infra Part IV.F.
188. 486 F. App'x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2012).
189. Id. at 223.
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Kiehle recommended that the child be returned to the
mother. Kiehle's testimony was offered voluntarily, for
the petitioner, without a subpoena. When she took the
stand, Kiehle introduced herself as a DSS caseworker,
and her conclusions were based on information she
obtained during the course of her public employment.
Further, while taking a position in her testimony that
was contrary to DSS's position in the proceeding,
Kiehle did not distinguish her personal views from those
of DSS. ... Kiehle did not testify as a private citizen on
a matter of public concern at the Family Court hearing;
rather, she testified as a government employee-as a
DSS caseworker. "[W]hen public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer
discipline." Thus, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to defendants.1 90
In sum, the majority of federal circuit court decisions pre-Lane
have agreed that, as a threshold matter, truthful voluntary testimony on a
matter of public concern should be protected under the First
Amendment.
2. Voluntary Testimony and Pickering Balancing
As noted above, essentially all pre-Lane courts that have concluded,
as a threshold matter, that voluntary sworn testimony is entitled to First
Amendment protection have also evaluated, consistent with Lane, the
several interests raised by the Pickering-balancing test.'9 Interestingly,
190. Id. at 223-24 (quoting in part Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
191. See Green, 105 F.3d at 887-89; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 358-67, 362 n.28; Worrell,
219 F.3d at 1201, 1204-09; Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1214-15. Both pre- and post-Lane commentators
have likewise concluded that voluntary sworn testimony regarding matters of public concern should
be protected under the First Amendment, subject only to Pickering balancing. See Deloney, supra
note 124, at 712 ("This Note ... adopts an approach that would classify compelled or voluntary
testimonial speech, in a criminal or civil context, as per se 'citizen speech,' speaking to a 'matter of
public concern.' From there, courts would apply the [Pickering] balancing test ... to determine
whether a public employee's First Amendment free speech rights were unconstitutionally infringed
upon."); Wolfe, supra note 160, at 1474, 1501 (protecting voluntary sworn testimony not given on
employer's behalf, but recognizing that "the public employer potentially could still discipline the
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those courts have reached divergent results.
Again, Green is a good starting point. In Green, the Third Circuit,
after concluding that voluntary testimony should not be treated
differently than compelled testimony for purposes of threshold First
Amendment protection, but picking up on its initial sentiment that he
two types of testimony are different, determined that application of the
Pickering-balancing test to the facts in Green caused plaintiff Green not
to be protected from retaliation under the First Amendment.19 2  The
Court of Appeals began its analysis by specifically noting the interests at
stake and stating that, "[i]f Green's court appearance could potentially
disrupt the work of the Housing Authority Police Department, and this
potential for injury outweighs the public's interest in Green's speech,
then judgment for the defendants is proper."'93 The court turned next to
the public's interest in protecting Green's speech, discounting the public
interest when voluntary, not subpoenaed, testimony is involved:
In weighing the competing interests, we begin with the
proposition that all court appearances are matters of
public concern. That is so because all court appearances
implicate the public's interest in the integrity of the truth
seeking process and the effective administration of
justice. But at the same time, it would appear that the
strength of the public's interest can vary based on the
nature of the court appearance. It is of some moment,
therefore, that Green appeared voluntarily, not in
response to a subpoena. As we have held, a voluntary
court appearance is a matter of public concern. We
encourage voluntary testimony so that parties and courts
have access to all available information and witnesses.
But the public interest favoring subpoenaed testimony is
even stronger. It implicates not only the integrity of the
truth seeking process and the effective administration of
justice, but also the public's interest in protecting court-
ordered conduct. As Green appeared voluntarily, it
employee in the name of workplace efficiency under Pickering"); see also Robertson, supra note
12, at 311-14 (agreeing that voluntary testimony should be protected and suggesting that Garcetti's
official duties threshold standard be jettisoned in favor of assessing employee duties as part of
employer interest under Pickering).
192. See Green, 105 F.3d at 887-89.
193. Id. at 887 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679-81 (1994) ("weighing First
Amendment 'value' of speech against 'the potential disruptiveness of the speech"')).
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would seem that the public's interest in his court
appearance is somewhat more limited than it would be if
his appearance were subpoenaed.194
The court then took up the governmental interest underlying its
decision to discipline Green, analyzing the facts and concluding in favor
of the Housing Authority Police Department as follows:
In comparison, the interests of the Housing Authority
Police Department as employer are very significant.
They include successfully fighting drugs and crime,
protecting the safety of its officers and other members
of the community, fostering trust and confidence among
its officers and between its officers and other law
enforcement drug units, and protecting the Housing
Authority Police Department's reputation.... These
interests merit substantial protection, and any risk of
departmental injury or disruption weighs heavily under
the Pickering balancing test. We agree with the district
court that there was a risk of departmental injury based
on the "potential disruptiveness of the speech." First, an
unnamed police officer telephoned Rosenstein to report
Green's appearance at Keller's hearing. Second, Green
testified at trial he heard comments from co-workers and
friends that "[g]uys wouldn't want to work with me
because they were afraid that I knew people in the
mob. . . ." Finally, because of the nature of DETF work,
any perceived breach of trust and security could
reasonably constitute a threat to the DETF, its officers
and its relationships with other police drug units and the
community it serves. This risk of injury to the Housing
Authority 'Police Department outweighs the public
interest favoring Green's speech.'9 5  Judgment as a
194. Id. at 888 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 888-89 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). There are several similar
decisions. See, e.g., Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1215 (where voluntary testimony substantially undermined
the relationship between the plaintiff and his supervisor, the supervisor reasonably believed that the
testimony was provided in violation of agency policy, and testimony could disrupt the employer's
relationships with other law enforcement agencies, the court held the testimony unprotected under
Pickering); Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1208-09 (where drug agents with whom applicant for drug task
force coordinator would have had to work with had they indicated they did not trust applicant
because he bad testified for a defendant in a murder trial, the potential for extreme disruption of task
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matter of law for defendants is proper under
Pickering.196
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion under
Pickering in Kinney v. Weaver.19 7 There, East Texas Police Academy
("ETPA") instructors Kinney and Hall served as expert witnesses,
voluntarily testifying for a civilian plaintiff against other police officers
in a civil rights action alleging excessive force.198 Not long after Kinney
and Hall testified, a number of cities and counties and their police chiefs
and sheriffs allegedly boycotted their classes and attempted to have the
two instructors removed from their positions.19 Kinney and Hall
brought several claims against the public entities and officials alleging,
among other things, that they had violated the First Amendment by
retaliating against the two instructors based on their having voluntarily
testified in the excessive force case.2 00  The district judge denied the
police officials' motion for summary judgment on Kinney's and Hall's
First Amendment claims.20 1
Eventually hearing the matter en banc, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's ruling on the First Amendment claims.202 Applying
Pickering, the Fifth Circuit first evaluated Kinney's and Hill's (and the
public's) interests:
[W]e conclude that Kinney and Hall present an
force's functioning existed). In addition, given the strong government interest involved in the
above-discussed Kiehle matter, the Second Circuit could have just as easily resolved that case in
favor of the DSS under Pickering, instead of on threshold First Amendment protection grounds
under Garcetti. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
196. Green, 105 F.3d at 889. Certainly, a strong and persuasive argument can be made that the
Housing Authority Police Department's interest should have been minimized to a level below
Green's and the public's interest in Green testifying. See id This argument is based on Green
having obtained consent to testify from his immediate supervisors, and his having made the decision
to not testify as a character witness once he learned in court that the son of his friend was charged
with participating in organized crime. Id. However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
summarily dispatched Green's arguments premised on consent and equitable estoppel, stating that,
"a public employee in a sensitive position like Green cannot turn a blind eye to the possible
consequences of his voluntary testimony. The responsibility must lie with Green to investigate the
nature of the criminal charges, and to bear any risks associated with his voluntary court
appearance." Id. at 889 & n.8.
197. 367 F.3d 337, 360, 374 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
198. Id. at 341-42.
199. Id. at 342, 344.
200. Id. at 345-46.
201. Id. at 340, 346.
202. Id. at 346.
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extremely strong First Amendment interest. The weight
of the First Amendment interest is, of course, not
measured solely by the instructors' own personal gain, if
any, from speaking. It is, rather, a function of the social
value of that speech. This court has emphasized the
great First Amendment significance of speech bearing
on official misconduct, "especially when it concerns the
operation of a police department." Indeed, because
individuals working in law enforcement "are often in the
best position to know "about the occurrence of official
misconduct, it is essential" that such well-placed
individuals "be able to speak out freely" about official
misconduct. Kinney and Hall, two experienced law
enforcement trainers with expertise in weapons and the
use of force, are ideally placed to offer valuable public
comnent about excessive force and the adequacy of
police training and supervision, the key issues in the
Kerrville trial. Moreover, as the district court pointed
out, "[i]ndividuals will have a hard time succeeding in
an excessive force case without the assistance of experts
who are intimately acquainted with police procedures."
Expert testimony is thus essential both in providing
victims with "the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees," as well as in serving
[section] 1983's parallel deterrent function. We thus
conclude that Kinney and Hall have a particularly
weighty First Amendment interest on their side of the
Pickering scales.203
Turning next to the police officials' interests, the Fifth Circuit
opined as follows:
With regard to the question whether the plaintiffs'
speech impaired the Police Officials' training
operations, the district court concluded ... that the
defendants had not identified any damage to the
efficiency of their operations brought about by Kinney's
203. Id. at 361-62 (citations omitted). Notably, unlike the Third Circuit in Green, the Fifth
Circuit did not discount Kinney's and Hill's (and the public's) interest due to the voluntary nature of
the two instructors' testimony. Compare id. with Green v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882,
888-89 (3d Cir. 1997).
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and Hall's testimony. .... This finding is not itself
determinative, for we ... are mindful of the fact that a
prudent administrator will often wish to take action
before a risk ripens into an actual workplace disruption.
The key limitation on preemptive action, however, is
that the officials' predictions of disruption must be
reasonable.... The district court addressed the issue of
whether disruption was a reasonable prospect, and its
conclusion was that "[t]here are genuine issues of fact
remaining in this case as to whether the plaintiffs'
expert testimony could legitimately cause any
disruptions in the defendants' operations." We are not
free to disregard that conclusion in this appeal.20
For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of the police officials' motion for summary judgment seeking to
prevail under the Pickering-balancing test.205
Based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lane, there can be little
204. Kinney, 367 F.3d at 364-65 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). The police officials also pointed to the workplace disruption caused by the police officials
boycotting Kinney's and Hill's courses at the ETPA. Id. at 363-64. The court of appeals refused to
place that fact on the police officials' side of the Pickering scales, stating that "[t]he question is
whether the plaintiffs' testimony posed a threat to the Police Officials' ability to deliver police
services, not whether the Police Officials caused a disruption in response to it." Id. at 364.
Likewise, the court rejected the argument that Kinney and Hill had undermined the police officials'
interest in loyalty and espirit de corps by testifying against police officers in the excessive force
case. Id. at 366. In this regard, the court stated as follows:
The Police Officials' charge of disloyalty makes sense only if Kinney and
Hall owe fealty to law enforcement universally. Indeed, the Police Officials'
stated view is that one is disloyal-and has committed an unforgivable
"sin"-whenever one testifies against law enforcement officers anywhere. A
concept of loyalty that sweeps so broadly is not one that may legitimately
trump compelling interests in speaking on matters of public concern.
Id.
205. Id. at 374; accord Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th Cir. 1989)
(finding that where a police officer voluntarily testified for a judge who was a criminal defendant,
the public interest in truthful testimony outweighed the public entities' interest in confidentiality or
possible disruption under Pickering); Minten v. Weber, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1020-24 (N.D. Iowa
2011) (holding that where a police officer offered to voluntarily testify against a sheriff in a civil
suit brought by plaintiffs alleging that denial of their applications for concealed weapon permits
violated their First Amendment rights, the public's interest in encouraging testimony disclosing
misconduct by the sheriff outweighed the police department's interest in operational efficiency and
harmony); Lynch v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 2d 224, 229-31 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(distinguishing Green, and where, assuming police officer voluntarily testified at subordinate
officers' criminal trials, plaintiff's (and public's) interest in truthful testimony was not outweighed
by minimal disruption caused to police department's operations).
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legitimate dispute that the majority of pre-Lane courts got it right:
whether testimony is voluntary or pursuant to a subpoena, two important
purposes would be served by placing all truthful sworn testimony by a
public employee pertaining to a matter of public concern within the
ambit of the First Amendment's protection against retaliation. First, as
made clear by the Third Circuit in Green and by the high Court in Lane,
the integrity of the judicial process-and, specifically, the pursuit of
truth in criminal and civil cases-remains a paramount societal goal
irrespective of whether a witness's testimony is compelled by subpoena
or voluntary.206 Second, as resurrected by the Court in Lane and stressed
in this Article, the ability of public employees to serve as sources of
information about corruption and other matters of public concern is
wholly unrelated to whether they testify voluntarily or are compelled to
testify via subpoena and cannot be gainsaid.207 Both of these important
purposes would be disserved if public employers were allowed to
retaliate against public employees who provide truthful sworn testimony
under the happenstance that their testimony was voluntary, rather than
compelled via subpoena.208 Thus, all truthful sworn testimony by public
employees-and not just testimony compelled by subpoena-regarding
matters of public concern should generally be protected under the First
Amendment.
However, as most courts and commentators have opined, protection
of voluntary truthful sworn testimony should be subject to a Pickering-
balancing analysis.20 9 Given the importance of truthful sworn testimony,
the Third Circuit in Green,2 10 as a practical matter, made too much of the
206. See Deloney, supra note 124, at 732 n.207 (citations omitted) ("Testimony, whether
voluntary or compelled, should be protected. Truthful testimony aids in the judicial process and
serves the public good regardless of the method by which it was obtained.").
207. See id.; see also Robertson, supra note 12 at 311 ("Public employees who witness
corruption or possess valuable information obtained through their employment should be able to
testify voluntarily without being hampered by fear of employment consequences.").
208. As pointed out by one commentator, "many witnesses are compelled by subpoena
arbitrarily," since "[a]ttomeys 'issue subpoenas to witnesses who would have voluntarily attended
even absent a subpoena."' Deloney, supra note 124, at 732 n.207 (quoting Brief for Am. Civil
Liberties Union & the Am. Civil Liberties Union of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 13, Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2377, (2014) (No. 13-483)). Likewise, another commentator has
pointed out that "if a subpoena is required for the testifying employee to maintain his First
Amendment rights, the testifying employee will always refuse to testify unless subpoenaed." Wolfe,
supra note 160, at 1500. In sum, the furtherance of important First Amendment purposes and
protections should not turn on such arbitrary practical matters and distinctions.
209. See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 382 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Green v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1997); Deloney, supra note 124 at
733; Robertson, supra note 12 at 303.
210. See Green v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886, 888 (3d Cir. 1997).
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difference in the public's interest in compelled, as opposed to voluntary
testimony. After all, for First Amendment purposes, the public's interest
in sworn testimony depends, not on whether the testimony is compelled,
but rather, whether the testimony is inaccurate or perjured.211 That said,
a public employer's interest in effectively and efficiently delivering the
public services concerning which it has been tasked cannot be ignored.
As pointed out in Green and other cases which have struck the balance
against protecting public employees from adverse employment
consequences based on their voluntary testimony, issues of
confidentiality, chain of command, employee discipline and employer
image 212-particularly in law enforcement, but also for other public
employers-are appropriately factored into the mix when assessing a
public employee's right to First Amendment protection for testifying on
a matter of public concern. Ultimately, though, as in Kinney and other
public employee-favoring cases,2 13 the Pickering-balance should only
cede to public employers when the incursion on their efficiency and
effectiveness is grounded in reasonable, factually-supported prediction
or actuality of disruption to the operation of public employers.
D. Testimony Whose Content Does Not Involve a Matter of Public
Concern
The Lane Court had little difficulty concluding that both the content
and context of Lane's speech--truthful testimony concerning corruption
in a state program and misuse of state funds at several judicial
proceedings-involved a matter of public concern protected by the First
Amendment under the Pickering/Connick standard.2 14 However, courts
of appeals and district courts-both before and after Lane-have been
sharply divided on the question of whether trial testimony, irrespective
of the content of the testimony, constitutes a matter of public concern
protectable under the First Amendment.215
Prior to Lane, the Third and Fifth Circuits took the most expansive
view regarding the question, holding that the sworn form and judicial or
211. See Robertson, supra note 12 at 311-13 ("So long as the testimony provided is truthful
and not misleading, the First Amendment should bar employer discipline even in instances of
voluntary testimony.").
212. See Green, 105 F.3d at 889-90; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 396-97, 398 (Jones, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 367; Tedder v. Norman, 167 F.3d 1213, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1999);
Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th Cir. 1989).
214. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380-81 (2014).
215. See infra notes 216-40 and accompanying text.
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formalized *context of testimony made it per se a matter of public
concern, even where the content of the speech involves a purely private
matter.216 For example, in Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control
District, Plaintiff Johnston brought a section 1983-First Amendment
claim against his employer, alleging that the district terminated his
employment in retaliation for his (Johnston's) testimony in support of a
co-employee's Equal Employment Opportunities ("EEO") claim. 2 17
Notwithstanding that the content of Johnston's testimony did not
constitute a matter of public concern under Connick, the district court
found in Johnston's favor on his First Amendment retaliation claim.2 18
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, initially stating that:
Johnston's testimony at the EEO hearing meets the
public concern requirement. HCFD's description of
Johnston's testimony is correct: Johnston testified about
a personnel dispute between HCFD and one of its
employees. In contrast, HCFD's conclusion that the
testimony was not of public concern is incorrect, for
HCFD ignores the context in which Johnston spoke. As -
a general rule, when a public employee speaks about
matters that are of personal interest only, the speech
does not address matters of public concern. Under
certain circumstances, however, the context in which the
employee speaks may be sufficient to elevate the speech
219to the level of public concern.
The court of appeals went on to foretell the Supreme Court's
rationale for protecting truthful testimony in Lane, opining as follows:
When an employee testifies before an official
government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks
in a context that is inherently of public concern.... We
would compromise the integrity of the judicial process if
we tolerated state retaliation for testimony that is
damaging to the state. If employers were free to
retaliate against employees who provide truthful, but
216. See Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also
Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cit. 1989).
217. Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1568.
218. Id. at 1576-78.
219. Id. at 1577 (citation omitted).
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damaging, testimony about their employers, they would
force the employees to make a difficult choice.
Employees either could testify truthfully and lose their
jobs or could lie to the tribunal and protect their job
security..... The goal of grand jury proceedings, of
criminal trials, and of civil trials is to resolve a dispute
by gathering the facts and arriving at the truth, a goal
sufficiently important to render testimony given in these
contexts speech "of public concern."220
Similarly, in Pro v. Donatucci, Plaintiff Pro worked in the Court
Clerk's Office under Defendant Donatucci's supervision.221 When
Donatucci's wife subpoenaed Pro to testify in her divorce action against
Donatucci, Pro appeared in court, but was not called to testify.222
Donatucci was present in court and saw Pro there.22 3 Shortly thereafter,
Donatucci terminated Pro's employment.224 Pro then brought suit
against Donatucci under section 1983, alleging that he fired her in
retaliation for activity protected by the First Amendment, specifically,
her appearance as a potential witness at the divorce proceeding.225 The
district court denied Donatucci's motion for summary judgment
predicated on a qualified immunity defense.226 Relying on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Johnston, the Third Circuit affirmed,227 holding that
Pro's appearance at the divorce proceedings, even without testifying,
"constituted protected speech because, contextually, the speech was on a
matter of public concern."228
At the other end of the spectrum, several more circuits prior to
Lane, including the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, held
that sworn testimony in a judicial or other proceeding will only
constitute a matter of public concern where the content of the speech
addresses a matter of public concern, (such as, a political, social or other
220. Id. at 1578.





226. See id. at 1286.
227. Id. at 1290-92.
228. Id. at 1291. Courts and commentators have properly made clear that, where truthful
testimony is deemed a matter of public concern because of its context, rather than its content, the
public employee must still prevail under the Pickering-balancing test to be protected under the First
Amendment. See, e.g., id; see also Jasperse, supra note 160, at 650-51.
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concern to the community).2 29 Thus, in Wright v. Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services, Plaintiff Wright, a social worker, was
disciplined for, among other things, testifying critically of her
department in a child abuse proceeding.2 30 Wright responded by
asserting several claims against her public employer, including a section
1983-First Amendment retaliation claim, upon which the district court
granted summary judgment against her.2 3 1 The Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded Wright's First Amendment claim,232 but stated as follows:
Drawing on Fifth Circuit cases, Wright suggests that we
ought to conclude that an employee who testifies before
an official government adjudicatory or fact-finding body
speaks in a context that is inherently of public concern.
Although we share our colleagues' concern for the
integrity of the judicial process, our cases have rejected
a blanket rule according absolute First Amendment
protection to communications made in the course of a
lawsuit. Such a rule would contravene both the
rationale of cases like Connick and Pickering that public
employee speech is protected against employer
retaliation only if it addresses matters of public concern
and the premise of McDonald v. Smith, that there is no
sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection
to statements made under the Petition Clause than to
other run-of-the-mill speech or expression. In short,
airing private gripes in the form of a complaint or
testimony cannot alter their status as private gripes.233
And, between these two doctrinal poles, the Ninth Circuit has held:
[A] public employee's testimony addresses a matter of
public concern if it contributes in some way to the
resolution of a judicial or administrative proceeding in
229. See Arvinger v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988); Wright v.
Illinois Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994); Padilla v. South-
Harrison R-ll Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Morris v. Crow, 142
F.3d 1379, 1382-83 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
230. Wright, 40 F.3d at 1497, 1494-95.
231. Id. at 1495.
232. Id. at 1509.
233. Id. at 1505 (citations omitted).
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which discrimination or other significant government
misconduct is at issue--even if the speech itself would
not otherwise meet the Connick test were we to consider
it in isolation.2 34
The post-Lane judicial results concerning the testimony/public
concern standard have been equally mixed.235 In Falco v. Zimmer,
Plaintiff Falco, a police chief in Hoboken, New Jersey, suffered loss of
stipends, salary and overtime compensation after he filed a lawsuit
complaining about the compensation issues and testified adversely to
Defendant Zimmerman, the Mayor of Hoboken, concerning those same
compensation issues and about Zimmerman's political animus toward
him in a lawsuit brought by another Hoboken employee against him and
the City.236  Although the district court dismissed Falco's complaint,
including his First Amendment retaliation claims, the court, citing to
Third Circuit per se authority and to that portion of the Supreme Court's
holding in Lane focusing on the judicial context, stated that
"[d]efendants do not contest that Plaintiff's participation in the law suits
constitute protected speech activity. The Court accordingly agrees that
Plaintiff engaged in protected speech."2 37
Other post-Lane courts, however, have continued to reject the per
se standard and have continued to hold that content matters. Thus, in
Moriates v. City of New York, Plaintiff Moriates alleged that the
234. Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). For pre-Lane
scholarly works collecting cases and discussing the Circuit split on the testimony/public concern
issue, see Jasperse, supra note 160, at 637-43; Scott E. Michael, Comment, "Lie or Lose Your Job!"
Protecting a Public Employee's First Amendment Right to Testify Truthfully, 29 HAMLINE L. REV.
413, 415, 425-37 (2006). Based on a desire to further the integrity of the judicial process and its
truth-seeking mission, and to protect public employees from retaliation, both of these pre-Lane
commentators have concluded that truthful testimony by public employees, irrespective of whether
its content involves a matter of public concern, should be protected under the First Amendment.
See Michael, supra note 234, at 415 ("The Supreme Court should adopt a standard holding that
truthful testimony by a public employee should per se qualify as a matter of public concern .... .");
see also Jasperse, supra note 160, at 625-26 ("[T]ruthful testimony in general, and particularly
compelled truthful testimony, should receive First Amendment safeguards, and its protection should
not be predicated on 'matters of public concern .... .'").
235. See infra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
236. Falco v. Zimmer, No. 13-1648, 2015 WL 7069653, at *1-3 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2015).
237. Id. at *8 (citations omitted); see also Helget v. City of Hays, Kansas No. 13-2228-KHV,
2015 WL 1263118, at *11 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2015) (noting pre-Lane split in the case law, but, under
Lane, even though "standing in isolation, the content of plaintiffs speech may not have raised a
matter of public concern," district court assumed, but did not decide, that speech in sworn affidavit
in co-worker's civil case was a matter of public concern), af'd on other grounds, 844 F.3d 1216
(10th Cir. 2017).
2892017]
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL
defendant police department retaliated against her after she had testified
at various administrative and disciplinary hearings for a fellow officer.23 8
The district court distinguished Lane and rejected Moriates's contention
that her speech involved a matter of public concern:
Plaintiffs reliance on Lane v. Franks . . . is woefully
misplaced. The plaintiff in [Lane] provided sworn
testimony in open court, compelled by subpoena, at a
criminal proceeding against a corrupt government
official. Nothing of the sort is, or, the record suggests,
could be, pled here. All that can be gleaned from these
bare allegations is that Moriates appeared on behalf of
coworkers at disciplinary hearings relating to workplace
policy violations. Given the complete failure to identify
what Moriates said at these hearings or why, it is
impossible to know if she spoke on a matter of public
concern. Plaintiffs characterization of these hearings,
and that they were internal disciplinary actions, make it
deeply improbable that these episodes involved matters
of public concern. The short of it is that plaintiffs
conclusory allegations about matters which are not of
"public concern" do not plausibly plead a [section] 1983
First Amendment retaliation claim.2 39
Lastly, as it did pre-Lane, the Ninth Circuit has arguably continued
to apply a middle ground test post-Lane, citing to and quoting its Alpha
Energy decision to the effect that "a public employee's testimony
addresses a matter of public concern if it contributes in some way to the
resolution of a judicial or administrative proceeding in which
discrimination or other significant government misconduct is at
issue. ,240
238. Moriates v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-4845 (ENV) (LB), 2016 WL 3566656, at *1-2
(E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016).
239. Id. at *5 (citations omitted); see also Meza v. Douglas Cty. Fire Dist., No. 2:15-CV-115-
RMP, 2016 WL 3746568, at *4 (E.D. Wash. July 8, 2016) (where a firefighter was allegedly
terminated in retaliation for having testified at a disciplinary hearing in relation to alleged
workplace policy violations of a fellow employee and union member, the district court found that
testimony did not involve matters of public concern).
240. Stillwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Alpha Energy
Savers Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2004)). Inexplicably, in quoting from Alpha
Energy, Stillwell omitted language at the end of the above-quoted language stating that the public
employee's speech would be protectable as a matter of public concern "even if the speech itself
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Whether public employee testimony whose content does not
involve a matter of public concern should be protected because of the
context in which the speech occurs raises the most difficult of the
unanswered questions in Lane. As discussed previously, Lane
emphasized two reasons for protecting public employees from retaliation
for testifying truthfully: first, to protect and promote the truth-seeking
function of the judicial and administrative processes,241 and; second, to
ensure that the public at large has a source of information concerning the
operation of a public employer-and, specifically, issues of corruption
and other matters of public concern-that may on occasion only be
provided by public employees.2 42  The first purpose relates to context,
and the second purpose relates to content.24 3 In Lane, where the public
employee testimony concerned corruption in the public sector
workplace,244 both purposes were served. However, in cases where the
content of the public employee's testimony does not involve a matter of
public concer-such as Johnston, where the testimony related to a
personnel issue involving the public employer, and, in Pro, where the
plaintiff appeared in a case, a divorce proceeding, that did not involve
the employer's operations, let alone corruption or wrongdoing in the
public sector workplace24 -- only the purpose of promoting truthful
would not otherwise meet the Connick test were we to consider it in isolation." See id.; see also
Alpha Energy Savers, 381 F.3d at 927. The post-Lane scholarship on the testimony/public concern
is sparse, but one commentator has agreed with pre-Lane commentators that all testimony,
irrespective of its content, should be protectable under the First Amendment. See Deloney supra
note 124, at 712 (proposing "a rule that provides for an exception to Garcetti when the speech at
issue is trial or grand jury testimony and adopts an approach that would classify compelled or
voluntary testimonial speech, in a criminal or civil context, as per se 'citizen speech' speaking to a
'matter of public concern'").
241. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S_ 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).
242. See id. at 2379-80.
243. See id. at 2381 (The circumstances under which the speech is uttered relates to context,
whereas the information contained in the speech relates to its content).
244. See id. at 2380-81.
245. See Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989); Pro v.
Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1996). Certainly, an argument can be made that speech by a
public employee on any matter---public or private and whether or not involving
testimony--otherwise protectable under the First Amendment should not subject the employee to
adverse employment consequences. See Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech
in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987) (proposing a public employee
speech doctrine that "abandons the 'matter of public concern' requirement and extends the first
amendment o all worker speech, regardless of the topic"). After all, retaliation by an employer
against an employee who speaks out about working conditions or the like in a non-disruptive
manner has no place in the public (or private) sector workplace. However, after Connick, this view
of public employee speech protection has never been the law. It would also depart from first
principles, enunciated in Pickering and reaffirmed in Lane, that "the first amendment interest to be
protected is that public employees be allowed to exercise the right 'they would otherwise enjoy as
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testimony would be served.
The question then becomes whether service of this latter purpose is
sufficient to protect public employees from retaliation by public
employers under the First Amendment. The answer must be that it does.
Stakeholders to judicial and administrative proceedings-the public at
large, the courts and tribunals, and the parties to the proceedings-are
entitled to truthful testimony in furtherance of the fact-finding and truth-
seeking goals of those proceedings. Likewise, public employees,
irrespective of whether their testimony involves a matter of public
concern about the operation of their employers, should not be placed in
the "impossible position" described by the Court in Lane2 46 (i.e., testify
falsely and commit perjury or testify truthfully and lose their job). For
these reasons, context alone under the per se rule described in pre-Lane
cases such as Johnston and Pro, and post-Lane cases such as Falco,
should be sufficient to cause truthful testimony to be protected under the
First Amendment.
E. False or Erroneous Testimony or Unnecessary Disclosure of
Sensitive, Confidential or Privileged Information
The Lane Court suggested in dicta that the outcome of the case
might have been different under the Pickering-balancing test if "Lane's
testimony at Schmitz'[s] trials was false or erroneous or that Lane
unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential, or privileged
information while testifying." 24 7  No post-Lane cases have discussed
Lane concerning the resolution of these two issues; however, pre-Lane
case law, at least one case decided after Lane but not discussing it, and
post-Lane commentators have all properly reached the conclusion that
public employee testimony falling into these two categories would not
be protected when assessed under Pickering.248
citizens to comment on matters of public interest-'-all to the benefit of the public at large.
Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public
Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 76 (1988) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
However, this broader issue need not be resolved to answer the narrower question of whether sworn
testimony concerning matters not of public concern should be protected under the First Amendment.
246. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381.
247. Id.
248. See infra notes 250, 252-54 and 256-62 and accompanying text.
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1. False or Erroneous Testimony
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved whether false
statements made outside of court may constitute protected speech under
the First Amendment and lower courts are divided on the issue,249 pre
Lane lower courts have held that public employees who testify falsely in
a judicial proceedings are not entitled to First Amendment protection
from discharge by public employers.250 Indeed, applying the Supreme
Court's decision in Waters v. Churchill,25' lower courts prior to Lane
have held that, where a public employer reasonably, but mistakenly,
believes that a public employee testified falsely, the employer may fire
the employee without offending the First Amendment.252 Courts have
largely based these later decisions concerning false testimony by
249. In Pickering, the Supreme Court stated that "we have no occasion to pass upon the
additional question whether a statement that was knowingly or recklessly false would, if it were
neither shown nor could reasonably be presumed to have had any harmful effects, still be protected
by the First Amendment." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6 (citation omitted). Although the Court
has stated in dicta that "an employee's false criticism of his employer on grounds not of public
concern may be cause for his discharge," Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (2008), the question
left open in Pickering concerning false statements about matters of public concern "has yet to arise
in a government-employee retaliation case before the Supreme Court." Spacecon Specialty
Contractors, LLC v. Bensinger, 713 F.3d 1028, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 2013) (Hartz, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). Lacking Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have split on the issue. Some
courts have held that false statements are per se unprotected under the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714, 721 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) ("Pickering
balancing is not required if it is determined that the employee made statements with knowledge of,
or reckless indifference to, their falsity."); Brenner v. Brown, 36 F.3d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Any
adverse employment action suffered by plaintiff was not the result of any protected speech; instead,
it was a reasonable response by her employer to outrageous and unsupported defamatory remarks.").
In contrast, other courts have rejected a per se approach, holding that false statements should be
analyzed under the Pickering-balancing test. See, e.g., Johnson v. Multnomah Cty., Oregon, 48
F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he recklessness of the employee and the falseness of the
statements should be considered in light of the public employer's showing of actual injury to its
legitimate interests, as part of the Pickering balancing test."); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 840
(1st Cir. 1985) (examining "pertinent interest to be weighed" concerning the speech); see also
Leslie S. Blickenstaff, Note, Don't Tip the Scales! The Actual Malice Standard Unjustifiably
Eliminates First Amendment Protection for Public Employees' Recklessly False Statements, 80
MINN. L. REv. 911, 912 nn.4-6 (1996) (collecting cases regarding the split in the circuits).
250. See Gilchrist, 173 F. App'x at 684-85; Lynch v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 2d
224, 230 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that where "no indication that [police officer] testified falsely or
in a manner which would undermine" the police department, there was a genuine issue of material
fact whether the speech was protected under the Pickering-balancing test).
251. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
252. See Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); Wright v.
Illinois Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1506 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted);
see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 685 (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that the reasonableness test in
the plurality opinion was approved by a majority of the Court and, therefore, constitutes a holding).
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applying Pickering, increasing the weight allocated to the public
employer's interest and reducing the weight allocated to the public
employee's interest on the Pickering scales as follows:
[I]f an employee has presented false testimony both
sides of the Pickering balance may be significantly
altered. As the First Circuit has recognized, "an
employer has a greater interest in curtailing erroneous
statements than correct ones, and still a greater interest
in curtailing deliberate falsehoods," and
"[c]orrespondingly, an employee's interest in making
public statements is heightened according to their
veracity."25 3
Similarly, one post-Lane commentator, discussing Lane and
Pickering, and acknowledging that public employees will usually prevail
on First Amendment retaliation claims when they testify truthfully on
matters of public concern, has recognized that the result may be different
when the employees testifies falsely:
That is not to say that there will never be instances
where the government is permitted to take action against
employees for their trial testimony. Testimony that is
later revealed to be false would provide the government
with a lawful basis for terminating the employee or
254taking other adverse action.
Unlike in Lane, where truthful sworn testimony was properly
viewed as critical to both the integrity of the judicial process and
society's interest in protecting sources of information about matters of
public concern,2 55 and was subject to essentially no counterbalancing on
the public emplojrer's side of the Pickering scales, false or erroneous
testimony by a public employee should be allocated essentially no
weight--either absolutely or in the Pickering-balancing process. False
or erroneous testimony debases the judicial truth-seeking process.
Likewise, that same testimony does not further-and, indeed, may
undermine-society's interest in learning about and ferreting out
253. Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505 (quoting O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 916 n.8 (1st Cir.
1993)).
254. Deloney, supra note 124, at 734.
255. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379-80 (2014).
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corruption in the government workplace. For these reasons, false or
erroneous testimony should not protect a public employee from
retaliation under the First Amendment.
2. Unnecessary Disclosure of Sensitive, Confidential or Privileged
Information
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lane, lower courts applied
Pickering to routinely reject First Amendment retaliation claims by
public employees seeking to challenge discharge or other adverse
employment action based on the employees' having disclosed-albeit
not while testifying-confidential or sensitive information held by the
public employer.25 6 Pre-Lane decisions concerning the same question in
the context of employer retaliation in response to sworn testimony in
judicial proceedings are scarce or nonexistent-although one court has
suggested that a police bureau's pre-authorization requirement for
officers wishing to serve as an expert witness might have been saved
from First Amendment infirmity if it had been narrowly tailored to
protect a municipality's legitimate interest in preventing disclosure of
confidential information.25 7
Post-Lane decisions have similarly rejected First Amendment
retaliation claims by public employees who disclosed public employer
258confidential information in settings outside of testifying in court.
Collins v. Gusman25 9 is most instructive on this point. There, Plaintiff
Collins, a deputy sheriff, brought a First Amendment retaliation claim
against Defendant Gusman, the sheriff of Orleans Parish, for preventing
256. See, e.g., Orange v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cited in
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of
"Efficiency," 23 Omo N. U. L. REv. 17, 41-42, 42 n.121 (1996) (alteration in original) (although
noting that although university administrator's "disclosure of questionable billing practices ...
involved a 'matter of public concern' . . . the government's interest in protecting the integrity of its
[ongoing] investigation into fraud clearly outweighed whatever interest [the administrator] had in
disclosing confidential information."); see also Signore v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1290, 1295-97 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (in a case involving a police department employee's
disclosure of theft of a department vehicle to a newspaper reporter, the employee's speech was not
entitled to protection under the First Amendment since his interest was outweighed by the city's
interest in ensuring efficient investigations by preserving, as confidential, details of a vehicle theft
while the criminal investigation, and possibly internal affairs investigation, were ongoing.); Barnhill
v. Bd. of Regents of UW Sys., 479 N.W.2d 917, 926-28 (Wis. 1992) (reaching the same result as
Signore, where a public university employee disclosed confidential survey results to a reporter).
257. See Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2002).
258. See Delano v. City of Buffalo, 45 F. Supp. 3d 297, 308, 310 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); Collins v.
Gusman, No. 14-234, 2015 WL 1468298, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2015).
259. 2015 WL 1468298, at *1.
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him from returning to work after he (Collins) had taken a photograph of
a crime scene depicting horrific conditions at the parish prison and
disseminated it to an advocacy organization who, in turn, provided it to
the local press.260 Citing Lane and Pickering, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Gusman, opining that
[P]1aintiff s interest in commenting on matters of public
concern, although significant, is outweighed by the
government's interest in the efficient provision of
government services. As an initial matter, plaintiffs
speech was made possible by his violation of the
Sheriffs Office's prohibition on the possession of cell
phones within the prison. Plaintiffs distribution of the
photograph without prior authorization constituted a
second violation of departmental policy. These
violations were especially egregious given that the
photograph at issue depicted evidence and the crime
scene in a then-open criminal prosecution. The
Sheriffs Office also produced uncontroverted evidence
that plaintiffs distribution of the photograph caused
significant disruption to Orleans Parish Prison
operations.2 61
Similarly, one post-Lane scholar, characterizing Lane as raising
questions at the intersection of whistleblowing and the First Amendment
commented that, "if there is evidence that an employee disclosed any
sensitive, confidential or privileged information those disclosures might
provide the government with an adequate justification to still
prevail . ... 262
The government, acting as a public employer, will occasionally
have a legitimate interest in preventing a public employee from
testifying truthfully about a matter of public concern that will outweigh
the employee, the judicial system, and society's interest in obtaining
truthful testimony from that employee. As discussed previously, this
interest may arise where the government has legitimate
reasons-including not compromising the confidentiality of an ongoing
operation, maintaining the safety of public officials and employees, or
260. See id.
261. Id. at *5-6 (citations omitted)
262. Michael Z. Green, Do Disclosures Prohibited by Law Torment Federal Whistleblowers
after Maclean?, 30 No. 13 WESTLAW J. EMP. 5, *5 (2016).
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not otherwise disrupting sensitive government operations-for objecting
to public disclosure of law enforcement or national security
investigations or operations.263 As such, disclosure by public employees
of confidential information,264 although often preventable by the
government by appearing at the proceedings at which the public
employee will testify and objecting to the employee's testimony
regarding legitimately confidential subjects, may properly cause a public
employee to lose under the Pickering-balancing test. Under those
circumstances, and as discussed below,26 5 that legitimate interest will
provide an employer with cause for taking adverse employment action
against the employee.
F. Public Employee Admission of Wrongdoing While Testifying
Toward the close of its opinion, the Lane Court noted that "quite
apart from Pickering balancing, wrongdoing that an employee admits to
while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other
discipline."2 66 Post-Lane, two district courts have applied the above-
quoted "wrongdoing" language, but concluded that sufficient factual
issues existed in each case such that pre-trial motions by public sector
employees could not be granted.267
Lane's "wrongdoing" dicta stems from two, related legal principles.
First, it stands for the proposition that, generally speaking, misconduct
by a public employee may give his or her employer just or good cause to
take adverse employment against the employee.268 Second, it may relate
to the Supreme Court's causation analysis in First Amendment
retaliation cases set forth in Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education. v. Doyle,269 where the Court held that, even if a public
employee has demonstrated that his or her protected speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in their termination, a public employer
263. See Diaz, supra note 118, at 595.
264. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014).
265. See infra Part U.F.
266. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 n.5. One judge, discussing Lane, has stated, "[a~lthough the act
of testifying is protected, the testimony itself is not privileged." See Avila v. Los Angeles Police
Dept., 758 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (Vinson, J., dissenting).
267. Calpin v. Lackawanna Cty., No. 3:16-2013, 2017 WL 590277 (M.D. Pa. 2017); Lumpkin
v. Aransas Cty., Texas. No. 2:15-CV-190, 2016 WL 7734607, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
268. See, e.g., Lujan v. City of Santa Fe, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1158-59 (D.N.M. 2015) (citing
Selneczki v. New Mexico Dep't of Corr., 129 P.3d 158, 163 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)); Woods v. City
of Berwyn, 20 N.E.3d 808, 817 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014).
269. 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977).
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may still avoid liability by showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have terminated the employee even in the absence of the
protected speech.2 70  However, even if a public employer. sustains its
evidentiary burden on the causation issue, a public employee's
admission during testimony that he or she engaged in
wrongdoing-particularly when it involves relatively innocuous, albeit
criminal, off-duty conduct or speech-should not lead to adverse
employment action against the employee in every instance.2 71 Likewise,
a public employer must adhere to any applicable progressive discipline
and/or due process requirements when disciplining or discharging a
public employee who admits to wrongdoing while testifying.272 And, if
a public employee has reached an agreement with his or her employer
that the employee's testimony about the misconduct will not cause him
or her adverse employment consequence, then the public employer must
honor that agreement.273
Certainly, if a public employee admits while testifying that he or
she engaged in wrongdoing, and the employee has not received any kind
of promise from his or her employer that the testimony will not be used
against him concerning his or her continued employment, that admission
may serve as a basis for the public employer to take adverse employment
action against the employee.274 However, that general proposition must
be limited by principles of causation, nexus of the misconduct to
employment, and progressive discipline and/or due process.
270. Id. at 287; see also Rivers v. New York City Hous. Auth., 176 F. Supp. 3d 229, 245
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases on issue of whether the longstanding Mt. Healthy "substantial
motivating factor" or recently-articulated Title VII "but-for" causation test applies to First
Amendment retaliation claims).
271. See John E. Rumel, Beyond Nexus: A Framework for Evaluating K-12 Teacher Off-Duty
Conduct and Speech in Adverse Employment or Licensure Proceedings, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 685, 705
(2015).
272. See In re Stallworth, 26 A.3d 1059, 1061, 1067, 1070 (N.J. 2011) (progressive discipline);
see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (due process).
273. See United States v. Anderson, 450 A.2d 446, 449 n.1 (D.C. Ct. A. 1982) (citing Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)). This type of agreement would be akin to a "Reverse Garrity"
warning, albeit in the public employment setting. A Reverse Garrity warning "informs the
employee that while a refusal to testify might have disciplinary or employment consequences,
neither the statement itself, nor fruits of the statement will be used against him in any criminal
proceedings." Id.
274. See Frequently Asked Questions, GARRITY RIGHTS, http://www.garrityrights.org/faq.html
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court left unanswered far more questions than it
resolved in Lane v. Franks. The Court, however, by resurrecting and
reemphasizing first principles from Pickering-that public employees
should be protected under the First Amendment from retaliation by their
employers because the employees are often uniquely situated to report
on corruption and other matters of public concern in the public sector
workplace-provided the compass by which courts should navigate the
difficult terrain posed by those open questions in the sworn testimony
context. Although the Court could more fully serve the public and
appropriately protect public employees by abandoning the ill-advised
official duties standard enunciated in Garcetti, unless and until it does
so, the Court and lower courts should take guidance from Pickering's
fundamental teachings, as reinvigorated by the Court in Lane.

